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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that Jane is a soldier who just received an order to abuse
prisoners, as in the case of Abu Ghraib, Iraq;1 to kill innocent civilian
villagers, as in the case of My Lai, Vietnam;2 or to participate in the
persecution and extermination of an ethnic group, as in the case of the
Holocaust.3 While we can argue over the specific details of the law that
should govern the extent to which soldiers have a duty to obey their
commanders’ orders, can anyone argue that the law should instruct a soldier
like Jane to obey orders in any of those three situations? Can anyone truly
argue that a soldier like Jane should not be expected to know that such orders
are illegal? Furthermore, let us assume that Jane obeys the order, she is put
on trial, and she raises the superior orders defense; a criminal law defense
that allows a subordinate to avoid culpability for an illegal act committed
under orders. Setting aside the question of if and when subordinates should
be allowed to raise this defense, does anybody truly think a soldier like Jane
should be sheltered from punishment by claiming obedience to orders?
Let us now consider the case of another soldier, Sue, who is a supply
sergeant. Her commander gives her an order to supply certain ammunitions
to a battalion in the field. Sue has doubts as to whether the ammunitions she
is instructed to supply in massive quantities are legal according to the law of
war, but she has no time to clarify the issue.4 If Sue is right, and the order is
1

E.g., United States v. Smith, 68 M.J. 316, 318 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (describing an order to
use unmuzzled military working dogs as a scare tactic during interrogations).
2
E.g., United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 538 (C.M.A. 1973) (describing an order
“to kill every living thing — men, women, children . . . and under no circumstances . . . leave
any Vietnamese behind”).
3
E.g., UNITED NATIONS WAR CRIMES COMM’N, HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS WAR
CRIMES COMMISSION AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF LAWS OF WAR 287 (1948) (noting that most
defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg pleaded not guilty on
grounds of superior orders).
4
Such a situation can occur not only due to a “simple” case of legal ignorance or a
commander’s malice, but confusion may be caused by an array of other reasons such as: (1)
There are several weapons that are clearly permitted during law enforcement activities and are
clearly forbidden during combat, such as tear gas and expanding bullets. Armed forces,
however, often engage in both kinds of activities. 1 JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUIS
DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW: RULES 265, 270 (2005).
Thus, a soldier might be confused as to when and where certain ammunitions can be used. (2)
Many of the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) rules dealing with means of warfare are
extremely technical and without any governing rationale, which may lead to confusion. For
example, international law prohibits the manufacturing of booby-traps that look like harmless
portable objects (e.g., making a bomb that looks like a camera) but allows attaching boobytraps to existing harmless portable objects (e.g., attaching a bomb to a camera). Protocol on
Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Bobby-Traps and other Devices (Protocol II)
(As Amended on May 3, 1996), art. 6, Oct. 10, 1980, 1342 U.N.T.S. 137, entered into force
Dec. 3, 1998; YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
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illegal, then obeying it will enable the commission of a war crime on a
massive scale. If Sue is wrong, and the order is legal, a legitimate military
attack might fail due to her mistaken refusal to supply the ammunitions.
When should Sue be punished for such obedience, if the order turns out to be
in violation of the law of war?
Lastly, consider a third case dealing with domestic law. Jill is an airplane
mechanic in the Air Force. Her commander gives her the order to do a quick
fix on an airplane engine. Jill vaguely recalls that Air Force regulations
forbid the kind of procedure she has been instructed to perform for safety
reasons, but she has no time to check the governing regulations. If Jill is
right that the order is illegal and obeys it anyway, the airplane might crash
and soldiers might die. If Jill is wrong and disobeys the order that is legal
and safe, an important military operation will be unnecessarily delayed.
When should domestic law obligate Jill to obey? Moreover, if Jill was
correct in suspecting the order to be illegal and yet decided to obey because
she was unsure of her assessment, should she be allowed to raise the superior
orders defense if she is later prosecuted?
When we think of the superior orders defense, we usually think of cases
like Jane’s. But, we should also have in mind cases like Sue’s and Jill’s, as
well as many others where the illegality and immorality of an order is less
apparent. Moreover, in this Article I will argue that by paying more attention
to cases like Sue’s and Jill’s, we can actually create a law that reduces the
likelihood of soldiers obeying orders in cases like Jane’s.
How do we want illegal acts committed under military orders, known as
crimes of obedience, to be regulated by the law? Jurists are in wild
disagreement on this subject and have only been able to agree that the issue
should be regulated by a “one-rule-fits-all policy” (i.e., the same legal rule
should be applied regardless of the subordinate’s rank or the kind of military
activity in which the order is given).5 Moreover, this dispute is not only an
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT 65 (2004).
5
It is commonly agreed in current legal discourse that there are three main approaches
dealing with obedience to illegal orders. The first approach is the “absolute liability”
approach. According to this approach, a military order can never serve as a basis for a
criminal law defense. The second approach is the “absolute defense” approach. According to
this approach, a military order is always a basis for a criminal law defense. The third
approach is the “conditional liability” approach. According to this approach, military orders
serve as a basis for a criminal law defense as long they are not manifestly unlawful. E.g.,
Abdul Ghafur Hamid, The Defence of Superior Orders, Manifest Illegality Principle and the
Statute of the International Criminal Court, in THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: RESPONSES TO A VARIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ISSUES 1, 5–7 (Abdul Ghafur
Hamid ed., 2009); Massimo Scaliotti, Defences Before the International Criminal Court:
Substantive Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility—Part 1, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
111, 127–28 (2001). Notice that each of these three approaches attempt to regulate the issue
through the use of a “one-rule-fits-all policy.” This description of the three approaches is
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academic one; in many legal systems, including international law, judges
differ in their interpretation of the relevant law on the books, causing
uncertainty and inconsistency in the applied law.6
This failure to agree upon a regulating norm is not due to a lack of effort.
Combatants are the perpetrators of the vast majority of war crimes,7 and they
often perform such crimes under orders.8 Thus, the superior orders defense
issue “has long been a critical issue in international criminal law.”9 The law
pertaining to obedience of orders is also a core issue for any domestic system
of military criminal law, since obedience to orders is the “cardinal virtue”10
somewhat inaccurate, since jurists vary in the ways they interpret each of the approaches.
Yet, these different interpretations do not attempt to change the one-rule-fits-all characteristic
of the approaches. As such, this common (though somewhat inaccurate) “three approaches
description” still helps to demonstrate the extensive consensus that currently exists regarding
the need for a “one-rule-fits-all policy.” Currently, the option of adopting an approach that
does not regulate the issue in such a manner is raised only rarely. See, e.g., DAVID ORMEROD,
SMITH AND HOGAN CRIMINAL LAW 357–58 (12th ed. 2008) (debating the possible English
adoption of a conditional liability approach when illegal orders are given during combative
actions and an absolute liability approach when illegal orders are given in non-combat
situations). Due to the varying interpretations of these three approaches, for the purpose of
accuracy in this Article, instead of referring to a single conditional liability approach, I shall
distinguish between two different conditional liability approaches. And, instead of referring
to a single absolute liability approach, I shall distinguish between a reduced sentence approach
and an equal liability approach. See infra Part II.A. Elsewhere, I have presented an even more
extensive survey of the different approaches that exist (i.e., the different interpretations of the
three approaches stated above). Ziv Bohrer, The Superior Orders Defense in Domestic and
International Law—A Doctrinal and Theoretical Revision 9–16 (June 21, 2012) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Tel Aviv University) (on file with author). Within the limits of this
Article, I focus on examining the five main approaches of current legal discourse. Since the
analysis in this Article shows that the application of any one-rule-fits-all policy is
inappropriate, it also disproves the other approaches, even though they are not explicitly
examined.
6
See infra Part II.B.
7
Jenny S. Martinez, Understanding Mens Rea in Command Responsibility: From
Yamashita to Blaškić and Beyond, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 638, 639 (2007) (identifying
combatants as the primary perpetrators of war crimes).
8
Aziz Mohammed, Military Culture, War Crimes, and the Defence of Superior Orders, 5–
7 (Aug. 30, 2008) (Doctoral Thesis in Legal Science, Bond Univ.), available at http://epublica
tions.bond.edu.au/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1071&context-theses.
In armed conflicts, too often there are gross violations of international
humanitarian law, and atrocities are committed against civilians and members
of the armed forces alike. . . . One of the most distinctive features about this
unimaginable loss of lives is that most deaths have occurred as a result of
atrocities committed under the disguise of obedience to superior orders.
Id.
9
Hiromi Sato, The Defense of Superior Orders in International Law: Some Implications
for the Codification of International Criminal Law, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 117, 117 (2009)
(“The defense of obedience to superior orders has long been a critical issue in international
criminal law. . . . However, till date, there has been much debate on the legal consequences of
the above mentioned defense.”).
10
MARK J. OSIEL, OBEYING ORDERS: ATROCITY, MILITARY DISCIPLINE, AND THE LAW OF
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of the military profession and the “backbone” of any armed force.11 Despite
this issue being central for both domestic and international law, it has yet to
be resolved.12 Moreover, in the past decade, this issue has even experienced
a surge of legal interest. This is in part due to the United States’ and other
countries’ prolonged involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan,13 as well as the
ratification by many states of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court (ICC), which includes a superior orders defense.14 Sadly, this
increased discussion has neither resolved the scholarly dispute, nor has it
reduced uncertainty and inconsistency in the application of the law.15
Thus, this Article re-examines the issue from a new perspective that
originates from the field of microeconomics; principal-agent analysis. This
analysis demonstrates that the core premise of current legal discourse—
regulation through a one-rule-fits-all policy—is flawed. Furthermore, the
principal-agent analysis’ concussions help to formulate, in this Article, a
model for a new legal policy; one that can better regulate the issue of
obedience to illegal orders.
The Article proceeds in the following manner: Part II discusses the
current approaches to crimes of obedience, all of which are one-rule-fits-all
policies. The actual harm caused by the current inability to agree on a policy
is also discussed, as are the reasons for the legal community’s inability to
come to a consensus. Part III offers a new way to assess the public aims
relevant to regulating crimes of obedience, by applying a principal-agent
analysis. This analysis shows how each of the currently suggested policies
influences subordinates’ and commanders’ behavior. It further uncovers the
lawmaker’s gains and harms under each policy. Doing so enables one to
compare the different policies—with regard to the extent each is beneficial to
the lawmaker. The analysis shows that none of the currently adopted
policies should be applied in all scenarios (i.e., in different situations, a
different policy will be the one most beneficial to the lawmaker). Part IV
discusses three additional matters that strengthen the conclusion that
WAR 1 (1999).
11
Mohammed, supra note 8, at 7.
12
See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text; see also Hersch Lauterpacht, The Law of
Nations and the Punishment of War Crimes, 1944 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L L. 58, 70 (“The problem
raised by the plea of superior orders is, by general admission, one of great complexity both in
international and in municipal law.”); M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY:
HISTORICAL EVOLUTION AND CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION 590 (2011) (reaffirming
Lauterpacht’s observation).
13
See, e.g., Sunita Patel, Superior Orders and Detainee Abuse in Iraq, 2008 N.Z.Y.B. INT’L
L. 91 (stating that “[t]he recent . . . cases in Iraq have thrown into sharp relief some of the
uncertainties surrounding the defence” since the mid-twentieth century).
14
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 33, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S.
90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
15
See supra notes 5–9 and accompanying text.
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obedience to illegal orders should not be regulated through a one-rule-fits-all
legal policy. First, it shows that even if the superior orders defense is viewed
as an excuse defense, it does not follow that regulation of obedience to
illegal orders should be done through a blanket application of one legal
norm. Second, it argues that, despite differences between international law
and domestic law, regulation of obedience to illegal orders through a onerule-fits-all legal policy is inappropriate in both contexts. Third, it points to
an element largely ignored in the current legal discourse—the fact that not all
laws subject to infringement by a military order are cut from the same cloth.
This variety, it is argued, serves as a further indication that crimes of
obedience should not be regulated through the application of a single policy
across the board. Part V suggests an alternative to current attempts to
regulate through a uniform policy. It proposes that different policies should
be applied in different circumstances, such that the policies are tailored to
accommodate the varied situations in which military orders are given. More
specifically, based upon the analysis’ conclusions, the main norms of such a
modular policy are formulated herein for use in international as well as
domestic law. These norms are designed with the idea that the law should
account for: (1) the rank of the subordinate soldier, and (2) whether the order
was given during an emergency situation.
II. THE CORE PREMISE OF THE CURRENT SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE
DISCOURSE
A. The Balancing Test
Maintaining a military is a necessity for states, as most would be unable
to protect either the instruments of government or the citizenry without one.16
A military cannot function efficiently if decisions are made only after
prolonged discussion between soldiers of different ranks. Thus, subordinates
are expected to comply with their superiors’ orders.17 At the same time, we
16
PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS 4 (2003).
17
Jeffrey F. Addicott, The Lessons of My Lai, 31 MIL. L. & L. WAR REV. 73, 88 (1992).
Moreover, as the court, in the classic case of McCall v. McDowell, stated:
The first duty of a soldier is obedience, and without this there can be neither
discipline nor efficiency in an army. If every subordinate officer and soldier
were at liberty to question the legality of the orders of the commander, and
obey them or not as they may consider them valid or invalid, the camp would
be turned into a debating school, where the precious moment for action
would be wasted in wordy conflicts between the advocates of conflicting
opinions.
15 F. Cas. 1235, 1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) (No. 8673); see also 2 PAUL H. ROBINSON,
CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES 210 (1984). Robinson argues against extending a superior orders
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do not wish the military to use its force in a wrongful manner. Accordingly,
the law limits the powers of the military by deeming certain actions illegal.18
Therefore, when determining the extent to which soldiers should be
encouraged to obey military orders, we should take into account both the
benefits of such obedience, as well as the harm that might result if such
encouragement leads soldiers to help their commanders commit illegal acts.19
It is important to make this assessment with the understanding that a
soldier’s knowledge of the law is usually imperfect.20 Thus, the more
strongly they are encouraged to disobey illegal orders, the more likely it is
they will mistakenly disobey some legal orders as well.
Moreover, one should acknowledge that asking a soldier to review the
legality of her commander’s orders places her in an extremely difficult
position, given time constraints, the authority the commander has over her,
and the soldier’s imperfect knowledge of the law.21 Given these factors, if a
soldier commits an illegal act under orders, we should take into account, not
only the social harms and benefits resulting from the soldier’s action, but
also the excusatory considerations that might arise in such a situation.22
How should these considerations be translated into a legal norm? Almost
all jurists believe that this issue should be regulated through a one-rule-fitsall policy.23 Moreover, there is consensus that such a rule should result from
balancing the rule of law against interests of military discipline and the
different excusatory considerations just stated.24 For example, in the leading
defense to subordinates of governmental agencies other than the military because “[t]he
special social interest in an effective military force, requiring strict discipline and nearly
unquestioned obedience to orders, is not always applicable to general public service.” Id. He
further states that compared to the military a greater “measure of independent judgment and
personal reflection” should be encouraged in other governmental agencies. Id.
18
FEAVER, supra note 16, at 4, 93.
19
State v. Sparks, 27 Tex. 627, 632–33 (1864).
20
Matthew R. Lippman, Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior
Orders Defense, 20 PENN. ST. INT’L L. REV. 153, 248 (2001); Mark J. Osiel, Obeying Orders:
Atrocity, Military Discipline, and the Law of War, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 939, 961 (1998).
21
Patrick White, Defence of Obedience to Superior Orders Reconsidered, 79 AUSTL. L.J.
50, 56 (2005).
22
Excusatory considerations can be defined as considerations that do not affect the negative
characteristics of the act, but support the conclusion that, due to the conditions under which
the person committed the act, the person should be viewed as less culpable or even not
culpable at all. See Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses: A Systematic Analysis, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 199, 203, 225, 240 (1982) (describing the circumstances that could exculpate
an actor when they conduct an otherwise criminal act).
23
See supra note 5.
24
For only a few examples out of the many articles that explicitly use the balancing
procedure, see, e.g., John H.E. Fried, Book Review, 61 AM. J. INT’L L. 1088, 1089 (1967)
(reviewing YORAM DINSTEIN, THE DEFENCE OF ‘OBEDIENCE TO SUPERIOR ORDERS’ IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1965)); Robert Cryer, Superior Orders and the International Criminal
Court, in INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 49, 55 (Richard Burchill et al. eds.,
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American case on the subject,25 Judge Duncan supported a particular rule by
stating:
[It] properly balances punishment for the obedience of an
obviously illegal order against protection to an accused for
following his elementary duty of obeying his superiors. Such a
test reinforces the need for obedience as an essential element of
military discipline by broadly protecting the soldier who has
been effectively trained to look to his superiors for direction. It
also promotes fairness by permitting the military jury to
consider the particular accused’s intelligence, grade, training,
and other elements directly related to the issue of whether he
should have known an order was illegal.26
Moreover this “balancing procedure” is used not only in the context of
domestic law, but also in the context of the international law on the subject.27
For example, Matthew Lippman has presented the issue in the following
manner:
The superior orders defense presents the perennial and
persistent problem of legal regulation over the military
management of armed conflict. Military organizations require
the expeditious and unquestioning implementation of policy
directives and subordinates are trained to conform and to
comply with superior orders. On the other hand, there are
permissible parameters on the pursuit of warfare. The
implementation of commands which contravene these
constraints poses a threat to innocents and may spark a spiral of
savagery. Legally limiting the obligation of subordinates to
adhere to superior orders, however, places combatants in the
precarious position of being compelled to choose between
patriotism and possible international criminal culpability. This
also assumes that the law of war is sufficiently clear and
2005); Jordan J. Paust, Superior Orders and Command Responsibility, in 1 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW 223, 225 (M.C. Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999); Mark W.S. Hobel, Note, “So Vast
an Area of Legal Irresponsibility”? The Superior Orders Defense and Good Faith Reliance on
Advice of Counsel, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 574, 596 (2011). It should be noted that, sometimes,
the balancing procedure is only implicitly referenced; jurists state the public aims they claim
should be taken into account and then argue one or another approach properly takes into
account these aims.
25
United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19 (C.M.A. 1973) (deciding a case arising out of the
massacre at My Lai).
26
Id. at 32 (Duncan, J., concurring).
27
See, e.g., sources cited supra note 24.
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concise to be comprehended by both high-echelon and lowerranking combatants functioning within the fast-moving field of
combat. High-ranking officers and commanders undoubtedly
are better positioned than subordinate soldiers to adjudge the
legality of orders by reason of education, experience, expertise,
information and perspective. The jurisprudence of the superior
orders defense is an exercise in balancing these competing
considerations.28
However, what is the content of this one-rule-fits-all policy?
Interestingly, jurists reach very different conclusions regarding the rule that
achieves the proper balance of the considerations stated above. Currently,
five approaches are generally recognized.
In order to illustrate the varying implications of these approaches, I shall
apply each of them to a single case, showing how the fate of a soldier
changes considerably depending on the approach applied. The case analyzed
is one where a subordinate soldier is given an order from her commander to
commit the war crime of fighting while wearing enemy uniforms.29 Let us
now apply the different policy approaches to this case.
The first approach, the “equal liability approach,” punishes both
commander and subordinate equally; whether a subordinate was obeying an
order is irrelevant.30 Accordingly, in the enemy uniforms case, both the
commander and the subordinate would be equally punished.
The second approach, the “reduced sentence approach,” considers the
commission of a crime under orders as a mitigating, but not exonerating,
factor.31 If this approach is applied to the enemy uniforms case the soldier
will be convicted, but the fact that it was a crime of obedience could mitigate
her punishment.
28

Lippman, supra note 20, at 248.
See, e.g., Trial of Otto Skorzeny and Others, War Crime Comm’n, 9 U.N. Law Reports
of Trials of War Criminals 90, 93 (1947) (General Military Government Court of the U.S.
Zone of Germany) (trying ten German soldiers for obeying an order to wear American
uniforms). Currently, Article 8(2)(b)(vii) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court forbids “[m]aking improper use . . . of the military insignia and uniform of the
enemy[,] . . . resulting in death or serious personal injury.” Rome Statute, supra note 14,
art. 8(2)(vii).
30
See, e.g., In re Greiser, 13 Ann. Dig. 387, 390–91 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland
1946) (applying the equal liability approach in international law context); United States v.
Carr, 25 F. Cas. 306, 308 (C.C.S.D. Ga. 1872) (No. 14,732) (applying the equal liability
approach in domestic law).
31
See, e.g., A. v. Hayden (1984) 156 CLR 532, 550 (Austl.); LYAL S. SUNGA, INDIVIDUAL
RESPONSIBILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW FOR SERIOUS HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 55 (1992)
(citing Formulation of the Nuremberg Principles, art. 8, [1950] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 181,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/22). The reduced sentence and the equal liability approaches are usually
not distinguished, and instead are often referred to jointly as the “absolute liability” approach.
29
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The third and fourth approaches both fall within the category of
“conditional liability approaches.”32 Under a conditional liability approach,
a superior orders defense should be afforded to a subordinate only under
limited circumstances, which are usually identified according to the
“manifest illegality test.”33 According to this test, “[a] person is not
criminally liable who performs an action commanded by a lawful authority,
unless the action is manifestly unlawful.”34 However, this test is extremely
vague, and differences in the interpretation of this test lead to the different
conditional liability approaches.35
The first conditional liability approach, the “normative approach,” calls
for the acquittal of a soldier committing a crime of obedience if the illegal
act was not grossly immoral.36 Thus, this approach places a high value on
maintaining military discipline, as a soldier is only under a duty to disobey if
an order is both illegal and grossly immoral.37 Under this approach, the
subordinate in the enemy uniforms case would probably be acquitted since
an order to wear such uniforms, albeit illegal, is not grossly immoral.38

32

This division is based on Enker’s division in Superior Orders Defense—A Symposium
Summary, 20 MISHPATIM 591, 598 (1991) (Heb.).
33
Paola Gaeta, The Defence of Superior Orders: The Statute of the International Criminal
Court versus Customary International Law, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 172, 176 n.7 (1999).
34
See, e.g., CODE PÉNAL [C. PÉN.] arts. 122–124 (Fr.), translated in John R. Spencer,
Criminal Code of the French Republic (2005), http://legislationline.org/documents/section/cri
minal-codes (demonstrating the manifest illegality test as codified in the French penal code).
35
See STEVEN R. RATNER & JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 136 (2001) (discussing the fact that this test has been
interpreted in a number of ways).
36
See, e.g., Mil. Appeal 279-283/58 Military Court of Appeals, Ofer v. Chief Military
Prosecutor, 44 PE 362 (Isr.) translated in Kafr Qassem: A Civilian Massacre, 2 PAL. Y.B.
INT’L L. 69, 108 (1985) [hereinafter Ofer Military Appeal] (discussing a conditional liability
approach); see also Montana v. Christopher, 345 F. Supp. 60, 61 (1972) (applying a normative
approach without referring to the manifest illegality test). For a discussion of the support for
this approach in international law, see OSIEL, supra note 10, at 71–90.
37
See, e.g., OFFICE OF J. ADVOCATE GEN., U.S. WAR DEP’T, A MANUAL FOR COURTSMARTIAL 355 (1920), available at http://www.babel.hathitrust.org (stating that for a soldier to
disobey an order of his superior, “the order must be one requiring something to be done which
is palpably a breach of law and a crime . . . or is of a serious character”); see also Ziv Bohrer,
Clear and Obvious? A Critical Examination of the Superior Order Defense in Israeli Case
Law, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 197, 221–22 (2005–2006) (stating that, under the normative
approach, a soldier can refuse to obey an order only if it is both illegal and grossly immoral).
38
See, e.g., 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, at 214–15 (“Some practice
was found that considers the wearing of enemy uniforms as perfidious. This does not square
entirely, however, with the definition of perfidy inasmuch as enemy uniforms are not entitled
to specific protection under humanitarian law, even though the wearing of such uniforms may
invite the confidence of the enemy . . . . Other practice considers it a violation of the principle
of good faith.”). For examples of illegal orders that most would agree are grossly immoral see
cases cited supra notes 1–3.
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According to the second conditional liability approach, the “factual
approach,” soldiers have a duty to obey only legal orders. Thus, if a soldier
obeyed an order when she knew it was illegal, she cannot later raise the
superior orders defense. However, an obedient soldier may be acquitted if
she was reasonably mistaken the order was legal.39 According to this
approach, if the soldier in the enemy uniforms case knew the order was
illegal, she would be convicted. Even if she did not know, she might still be
convicted if a court rules that a reasonable soldier should have known such
an order was illegal.
The fifth approach, the “respondeat superior approach,” places the
subordinate under an absolute duty to obey all orders, both legal and illegal.
When a crime of obedience has been committed, the subordinate always
benefits from the superior orders defense, whereas the commander is held
responsible.40 As such, the soldier in the enemy uniforms case would be
acquitted. The respondeat superior approach lost support following WWII41
and thus, it is almost never endorsed.42
39

Hamid, supra note 5, at 5–6; JOINT SERV. COMM. ON MILITARY JUSTICE, MANUAL FOR
COURTS-MARTIAL, R.C.M. 916(d) (2008) [hereinafter 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL],
available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2008.pdf.
40
See, e.g., Quincy Wright, The Outlawry of War, 19 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 79 (1925)
(“Efforts to hold individuals liable before an international tribunal for such acts when
committed under orders . . . would be destructive of discipline.”); Clyde Eagleton, Editorial
Comment, Punishment of War Criminals by the United Nations, 37 AM. J. INT’L L. 495, 497
(1943) (“It is suggested also that the principle respondeat superior be in general
accepted. . . . [I]t is repugnant to the average person to think of punishing a soldier who, in the
first place, would be ignorant of the legality or illegality of his act and, in the second place,
would be shot immediately if he refused to obey the order to perform the illegal act.”).
41
See Gary B. Solis, Obedience of Orders and the Law of War: Judicial Application in
American Forums, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 481, 483–84 (2003) (stating that World War II
and Nuremberg “materially altered the legal position of the soldier who pleaded obedience to
superior order in defense of his war crimes” and that “society as modernly organized cannot
tolerate so broad an arch of official irresponsibility” as the one afforded under the respondeat
superior approach).
42
As stated above, in current legal discourse it is commonly stated that there are only three
main approaches dealing with obedience to illegal orders: “absolute liability,” “absolute
defense,” and “conditional liability.” See supra note 5. Such a description ignores the verity
of ways in which the term “manifestly unlawful” is interpreted and thus inaccurately assumes
that only a single conditional liability approach exists. This description also conflates the
equal liability and reduced sentence approaches–viewing them as a single “absolute liability”
approach. It does so by focusing on a main attribute these approaches share in common–the
complete rejection of a superior orders defense–and by ignoring the difference that exists
between these two approaches with regard to issue of sentencing. As for my use of the term
“respondeat superior approach” and not “absolute defense approach”: currently, when the
three-approaches description is used, these two terms are usually viewed as interchangeable.
Yet, in the past, another approach was advanced that, currently, when the past sources
supportive of it are not ignored, they are usually conflated with the past sources supportive of
the “respondeat superior approach.” This past approach is the “Act of State” approach. Due
to the current common disregard to this approach, I chose, within the limits of this Article, not
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The diversity of outcomes that results from the application of each of
these approaches indicates that the use of a balancing procedure is flawed.
Otherwise a consensus as to which approach achieves the most appropriate
balance should have been developed. This lack of consensus is a common
result when jurists attempt to formulate legal policy by balancing abstract
public interests.43 For example, everyone can agree that maintaining military
discipline is an aim that should be taken into consideration when determining
whether a superior orders defense is appropriate. However, what sort of
discipline do we envision when we say this, and how much weight should it
be given? Is military discipline undermined only when a legal order is
disobeyed, as supporters of the equal liability approach44 and the reduced
sentence approach45 argue? Or is it undermined in all cases in which a
soldier disobeys an order, even an illegal one, as supporters of the respondeat
superior approach46 and many supporters of the conditional liability
approaches47 argue?
B. The State of Applied Law
The state of current applied law (lex lata)48 serves as an additional
indication that applying either an abstract balancing procedure or a one-rulefits-all policy is flawed. Although jurists in many legal systems claim lex
lata is consistently applied, it is often the case that different jurists within the
same legal system disagree on what legal rule is applied.49 This situation
to examine it, nor to discuss the differences between it and the respondeat superior approach.
43
See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE L.J.
943, 975 (1987) (noting decisions that reach conflicting conclusions when attempting to
“strike the unstrikeable balance”).
44
E.g., In re Greiser, 13 Ann. Dig. 387, 390–91 (Supreme National Tribunal of Poland
1946).
45
E.g., Shlomit Wallerstein, Why English Law Should Not Incorporate the Defence of
Superior Orders, 2010 CRIM. L. REV. 109, 114, 120 (explaining that soldiers only have a duty
to obey lawful orders and cannot assume that the duty to obey superiors overrides the law).
46
E.g., Wright, supra note 40 (arguing that holding an individual liable for acts committed
under orders is “destructive of discipline”).
47
E.g., sources cited supra note 17.
48
A common distinction in legal analysis is between the law as it is (lex lata) and the law
as it should be (lex ferenda). WALTER JOHN RAYMOND, DICTIONARY OF POLITICS 281 (7th ed.
1992). Another important distinction is between lex lata as it is declared to be by lawmakers
and courts (and to some extent also by legal scholars), which is commonly referred to as “law
in books,” and lex lata as it actually is, which is commonly referred to as “law in action.”
Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 15 (1910). The current
section presents different legal sources that declare what lex lata is in order to show that the
law in action (i.e., the actual lex lata) is uncertain and inconsistent.
49
Compare, e.g., JONATHAN HERRING, CRIMINAL LAW – TEXTS, CASES, AND MATERIALS
706 (2006) (“Superior orders has never been recognized as a defence in English and Welsh
law.”), with Koji Kudo, Command Responsibility and the Defence of Superior Orders 40 (Oct.
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both indicates that the applied law is in fact inconsistent and uncertain, and
that the current way in which the issue of obedience to orders is dealt with
only aggravates this uncertainty.50
Given that even jurists disagree on what the law is, how can we expect a
field soldier to immediately recognize which orders she must disobey? This
ambiguity leads to unjust consequences for those soldiers who might be
charged with crimes of obedience, as it violates principles of fair notice.51
Moreover, the inconsistent application of law within a legal system violates
the principle of fair treatment under the law because soldiers, committing
similar crimes, are held to different standards.52
1. International Law
Inconsistent application of the obedience-to-orders law is evident in the
realm of international law, where extensive disagreement regarding the
content of the relevant customary international law exists.53 Moreover,
supporters of each view can point to case law, international documents, and
statements of various states to support their argument.54
2007) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Leicester) (“[T]he current position of the UK is
similar to the manifest illegality principle.”). In many countries, the law adopts a “manifest
illegality test,” the adoption of this test rules out the application of approaches other than ones
of conditional liability. Yet, adopting this test does not resolve the problems of uncertainty
and inconsistency. Often, in such a legal system inconsistency exists in the way the “manifest
illegality test” is interpreted; i.e., different jurists, within such a legal system, often differ in
the conditional liability approach that they attribute to this test. See, e.g., Bohrer, supra note
37, at 213–19.
50
See Patel, supra note 13, at 129 (stating that case law in the U.K., the U.S., and in
international law “has been erratic and at times inconsistent”); Andreas Zimmermann,
Superior Orders, in I THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A
COMMENTARY 957, 965 (A. Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (“[T]he leading scholars in the field
themselves cannot agree as to what the standard should be de lege ferenda and even less what
it is de lege lata.”); White, supra note 21, at 51, 60 (discussing international, New Zealand’s,
Australia’s, Canada’s and U.S. law); Bohrer, supra note 37, at 213–19 (discussing uncertainty
and inconsistency in Israeli law).
51
Paul H. Robinson, Fair Notice and Fair Adjudication: Two Kinds of Legality, 154 U. PA.
L. REV. 335, 364–67 (2005).
52
Id. at 366–67.
53
Zimmermann, supra note 50, at 965.
54
The following section points to such contradictory sources of international law from
recent years, but this phenomenon is not new. For example, post-World War II case law is
extremely inconsistent on the legal implications of obedience to illegal orders. Some point out
this inconsistency and argue that a customary international law has not developed. E.g., Osiel,
supra note 20, at 947–48. Others, however, pick and choose from case law the legal sources
supportive of their view, claiming that those chosen are the obligatory precedents and
discounting contradictory sources as non-obligatory (or, alternatively, reinterpreting such
sources to support their position). Compare ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
LAW 236–40 (2003), and Gaeta, supra note 33, at 183–85 (arguing, based on post-World War
II case law, that the superior orders defense is not codified in customary international law),

2012]

THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE

15

This inconsistency is demonstrated by how this issue has been regulated
in the last two decades. The international statutes establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) rejected the adoption of
any sort of superior orders defense.55 But, this approach was not
subsequently adopted by all in the realm of international law. By the mid1990s, a large group of states reached an agreement on a general rule
regarding crimes of obedience, which was then incorporated into Article 33
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court.56 Interestingly,
unlike in the legal norm decreed for ICTY and ICTR, here a rule that
explicitly rejects the superior orders defense was not adopted. Article 33
states that obedience to orders will not relieve a person of criminal
responsibility unless she “did not know that the order was unlawful,” and
“the order was not manifestly unlawful.”57 However, despite its adoption by
many states, Article 33 also did not resolve legal uncertainty.
First, Article 33 has been interpreted in a variety of ways. Some interpret
this rule as supportive of the factual approach.58 Some argue that almost all
orders to commit war crimes are manifestly unlawful, and therefore Article
33, despite its phrasing appearing to support the factual approach,59 truly
espouses a reduced sentence or equal liability approach.60 A third group
argues that not all orders to commit war crimes are manifestly unlawful and,
since only grossly immoral orders are of sufficient gravity to support war
crime prosecutions, Article 33 actually supports a normative approach.61
Furthermore, the adoption of Article 33 did not prevent inconsistency in
the practices of international and internationalized tribunals. Despite Article
33’s adoption of a phrasing that allows for the application of a conditional
liability approach, the statutes of many ad-hoc tribunals formed afterwards
with Scaliotti, supra note 5, at 133–35, and GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE
GENERAL PART 296–301 (2d ed. 1961) (arguing, based on the post-World War II case law,
that customary international law is supportive of a conditional liability approach).
55
S.C. Res. 827, art. 7.4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993) (establishing the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); S.C. Res. 955, art. 6.4, U.N. Doc.
S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing the International Tribunal for Rwanda).
56
Rome Statute, supra note 14.
57
Id. art. 33.1(b)–(c).
58
See, e.g., Hilaire McCoubrey, From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the Defence of
Superior Orders, 50 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 386, 386 (2001) (arguing that Article 33 merely
recognizes the “ought to know doctrine” of customary international law rather than creating a
new approach).
59
See Gaeta, supra note 33, at 173 (admitting that it seems as if the article’s phrasing
supports the factual conditional liability approach).
60
See id. at 185; CASSESE, supra note 54, at 233 (contending that orders resulting in war
crimes are always manifestly unlawful and thus will always result in soldier’s being held liable).
61
E.g., Ariel Zemach, Fairness and Moral Judgments in International Criminal Law: The
Settlement Provision in the Rome Statute, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 895, 913–15 (2003).
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did not follow its path. These statutes, similarly to those of ICTY and ICTR,
adopted phrasing that clearly bars the application of any superior orders
defense.62 Moreover, although the statutes of the different ad-hoc tribunals
include a similarly phrased rule, how the tribunals applied the rule is far from
similar. In separate cases, the ICTY63 and the Special Court for Sierra
Leone64 have both ruled that when orders are manifestly unlawful they
cannot be considered as a mitigating factor. Furthermore, the ICTY trial
chamber admitted in another case that “the current case law of the Tribunal
does not evidence a discernible pattern of the Tribunal imposing sentences
on subordinates that differ greatly from those imposed on their superiors.”65
These rulings indicate that an equal liability approach was applied. On the
other hand, in many cases the East Timor Tribunal considered obedience to
orders as a mitigating factor, even when the orders were manifestly illegal.66
Additionally, the Iraqi Tribunal, when reviewing the compatibility of its
statute’s rejection of the superior orders defense with the principle of nullum
crimen sine lege (“no crime without law”), stated a rationale applicable only
to high-ranking soldiers, thus implying support for a conditional liability
approach with regard to low-ranking soldiers.67
This inconsistency exists even within the same tribunal. For example,
contrary to the general policy of the East Timor Tribunal stated above,
judges of that Tribunal would sometimes refer to “mitigating factors such
as . . . subordinate position,” but then mechanically discount these factors
arguing they “cannot be given any significant weight in a case of this
gravity.”68 Jurists within the ICTY have also disagreed, as evidenced by
62

The Statutes of the tribunals in East Timor and Sierra Leone, as well as that of the Iraqi
Special Tribunal explicitly state that obedience to orders cannot relieve a soldier of criminal
responsibility, and only allow obedience to be considered “in mitigation of punishment if a
panel determines that justice so requires.” U.N.T.A.E.T. Reg. 2001/15, art. 21, U.N. Doc.
UNTAET/REG/2001/15 (June 6, 2000) (establishing panels with exclusive jurisdiction over
serious criminal offenses in East Timor); Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, U.N.Sierra Leone, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 138; Statute of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, 44 AL
WAQAI AL-IRAQIYA [OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF IRAQ] 127 (2003) (codifying the reduced sentence
approach in Art. 15(e)).
63
Prosecutor v. Mrdja, Case No. IT-02-59-S, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 65, 67 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 31, 2004).
64
Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-04-16-T, Sentencing Judgment, ¶¶ 121–122
(Special Ct. for Sierra Leone July 19, 2007).
65
Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 709 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Aug. 2, 2001).
66
See generally Suzannah Linton & Caitlin Reiger, The Evolving Jurisprudence and
Practice of East Timor’s Special Panels for Serious Crimes on Admissions of Guilt, Duress
and Superior Orders, 4 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 167 (2001).
67
Anfal Campaign Case (2007) Ref. No. 1/CSecond/2006, Iraqi High Tribunal, 2d
Criminal Court, Trial Judgment, 11.
68
Mark A. Drumbl, Collective Violence and Individual Punishment: The Criminality of
Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 565 (2005).

2012]

THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE

17

President Cassese’s dissenting opinion in the Erdemovic case, which
implicitly supports a conditional liability approach by stating that “[i]f the
superior order is manifestly illegal under international law, the subordinate is
under a duty to refuse to obey the order.”69 Thus, the fate of soldiers
committing similar crimes of obedience may be considerably different
depending on the tribunal and the judge adjudicating their cases; a result that
severely violates the principle of equal protection under the law.
2. American Military Law
It has been suggested that the United States’ legal approach to crimes of
obedience does not suffer from uncertainty and inconsistency.70 Indeed,
since 1951, the Manual for Courts Martial includes a rule clearly supporting
the factual approach to the superior orders defense.71 But, promulgation of
this rule did not resolve a struggle that exists between U.S. supporters of
different conditional liability approaches, a fact which is readily apparent in
courts martial rulings after 1951.72
An attempt to resolve this issue was made in United States v. Calley,
which dealt with the My Lai massacre.73 In Calley, the trial judge instructed
the jury to apply the factual approach adopted by the Manual for Courts
Martial. On appeal, the defense claimed the normative approach should have
been applied instead.74 Thus, Calley presented the court with an opportunity
69

Prosecutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Separate and Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Cassese, ¶ 15 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 17, 1997).
70
See, e.g., GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 570 (1978) (“Not all
justificatory claims are vague . . . superior orders [is] . . . as precise as any prohibitory norm.”).
71
See United States v. Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 534, 545 n.2 (C.M.A. 1973) (Duncan, J.,
concurring) (discussing the Manual published in 1951 as being the first military manual in
which the current standard has been explicitly adopted).
72
See, e.g., United States v. Miles, 29 C.M.R. 438 (1960) (in this case the majority supported
the factual approach; the minority judge, on the other hand, supported the normative approach,
while giving some lip service support for the factual approach). In many cases, the ruling is an
intricate combination of phrases originating from one approach, interspersed with phrases
originating from the other. Due to this ambiguous wording, the identity of the approach actually
being supported in such rulings can only be understood from the decision’s general tone. See,
e.g., United States v. Whatley, 20 C.M.R. 614, 618 (A.B.R. 1955) (supporting the normative
approach despite discussion of a knowledge requirement); United States v. Kinder, 14 C.M.R.
742, 773–76 (A.B.R. 1954) (supporting the factual approach despite a discussion of the
manifestly unlawful requirement which interpret this requirement, at least in some parts of the
case, in the manner in which it is interpreted by the normative approach).
73
22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973).
74
Id. at 541–42. U.S. case law presents a unique version of the normative approach, where
the illegality of an order needs to be so apparent that even the soldier with the “commonest
understanding” would immediately recognize its illegality. This approach is phrased in terms
that focus on a soldier’s knowledge, but it is often assumed that the soldier with the
“commonest understanding” will recognize the illegality of an order only when core social or
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to clarify which approach should be endorsed by U.S. military tribunals, but
the court did not do so. Although the dissenting opinion examined several
approaches in coming to the conclusion the normative approach should be
applied,75 the majority was not as robust in its analysis and rejected the
appeal based on procedural and formalistic reasons.76 Moreover, in a
concurring opinion, Judge Duncan stated “[p]erhaps a new standard, such as
the dissent suggests, has merit; however, I would leave that . . . for the cause
where the record demonstrates harm from the instructions given. I perceive
none in this case.”77
Furthermore, although some claim the factual approach is the rule of the
day,78 a more in-depth examination of the issue shows that the current legal
situation is more complex. First, opinions still use language that borrows
from the normative approach.79 There are even cases where judges
seemingly hide their support for the normative approach behind their token
obeisance to the factual approach.80 Second, obiter dicta that implies support
for a normative approach can be found. For example, a 1995 opinion states
“[t]he duty to disobey an unlawful order applies only to ‘a positive act that
constitutes a crime’ that is ‘so manifestly beyond the legal power or
discretion of the commander as to admit of no rational doubt of their
unlawfulness.’ ”81 This statement implies that a soldier should obey if the
illegal act ordered does not constitute a crime, which appears to be a
normative approach.
Third, even though the “law on the books” (i.e., the Manual for Courts
Martial since 1951) states that a factual approach should be applied, once
prosecutorial policy is taken into account, it seems that a normative approach
is actually being applied.82 Military culture still supports the normative
moral norms are grossly violated by the illegal order. Thus, this test actually applies the
normative conditional liability approach and not the factual one. For the leading classic cases
supportive of the “commonest understanding” test, see McCall v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 1235,
1240 (C.C.D. Cal. 1867) and In re Fair, 100 F. 149 (C.C.D. Neb. 1900).
75
Calley, 22 U.S.C.M.A. at 546–48 (Darden, C.J., dissenting).
76
Id. at 544–45.
77
Id. at 545 (Duncan, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
78
See 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 39; MICHAEL J. DAVIDSON, A
GUIDE TO MILITARY CRIMINAL LAW 68 (1999); see also United States v. Girouard, ARMY
20070299, 2010 CCA LEXIS 49, at *15–16 (A. Ct. Crim. App. Apr. 23, 2010) (stressing the
actual knowledge of the defendant).
79
See, e.g., United States v. Cherry, 22 M.J. 284, 286 (C.M.A. 1986); United States v. New,
50 M.J. 729, 744 (A. Ct. Crim. App. 1999) (discussing obedience to manifestly unlawful orders).
80
E.g., United States v. Pacheco, 56 M.J. 1, 6–11 (C.A.A.F. 2001) (Sullivan, J., dissenting).
81
United States v. Huet Vaughn, 43 M.J. 105, 114–15 (1995) (quoting United States v.
Calley, 22 U.S.M.C.A. at 543) (emphasis added); see also DEP’T OF DEF., THE ARMED FORCES
OFFICER 16 (1988) (“Only when the order is unlawful and obviously a crime must it be
disobeyed.”).
82
For a discussion of the common phenomenon of a difference between the law as it is
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approach, and U.S. J.A.G. policy is thus to refrain from prosecution unless
the act ordered and committed is grossly immoral.83 However, the law on
the books still requires a soldier to disobey an order if she knows it to be
illegal, which creates a fair-notice problem for a soldier who receives an
order she thinks is illegal, but not grossly immoral. Should she disobey and
suffer the ire of her commander, as well as risk the chance she is mistaken
and the order is legal? Or, should she obey and rely on an unofficial
prosecutorial policy that might easily be changed?
III. AGENCY ANALYSIS OF OBEDIENCE TO ORDERS
A. Use of Agency Models
In light of the inability to resolve the issue through the conventional use
of the balancing procedure, the time has come to examine the issue from a
new perspective.
This perspective should examine the relevant
considerations in a less abstract manner than the current balancing procedure,
which can be achieved using principal-agent analysis.
The basic situation analyzed by microeconomics agency models can be
described as follows: The principal profits from the acts of its agent and
seeks to minimize costs while creating an incentive structure (i.e., rewards or
sanctions) that will lead the agent to perform the acts in a way that
maximizes the principal’s utility. One fundamental problem the principal
faces, often referred to as “moral hazard,” stems from the principal’s
inability to obtain perfect information about how the agent acts. If the agent
knows that her actions are unobservable, she can attempt to maximize her
own personal gains, even if that conflicts with the principal’s gains. Agency
analyses often focus on ex ante conditions that a principal can set to
minimize this problem.84
Agency analyses have been expanded to examine situations in which
more than one agent exists.85 This sort of expanded analysis is commonly
used when examining a corporation’s vicarious liability.86 Such analyses
examine a three-tiered hierarchy of principals and agents, where a
stated in the books and the law as it is actually applied, see Pound, supra note 48.
83
OSIEL, supra note 10, at 76; Walter M. Hudson, Book Review, 161 MIL. L. REV. 225,
226–27 (1999) (reviewing OSIEL, supra note 10).
84
See, e.g., ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 477–88 (1995)
(describing the principal-agent problem).
85
E.g., Yeong Ling Yang, Degree of Supervision, Moral Hazard and Hierarchical Control,
26 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 93 (1995).
86
See Alan O. Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious Liability, 93 YALE L.J. 1231, 1233
(1984) (noting that agency theory is essential to understanding the consequences of vicarious
liability).
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corporation’s employees are viewed as agents of the corporation, and both
the corporation and its employees are viewed as agents of the lawmaker.87
The core question examined is: When should the lawmaker, in an attempt to
prevent wrongful corporate acts, enact a law that sanctions the corporation,
the employees, or both?
B. Agency Model of Obedience to Orders
An in-depth agency analysis of crimes of obedience has never been
performed. However, Eric Posner and Alan Sykes have recently examined
the relationship between state and individual responsibility for violations of
international law, treating it as analogous to vicarious liability analysis.
Within their study, they entertain a short discussion of the superior orders
defense:
The question arises, why the qualification for “patently” illegal
orders? Why not hold soldiers liable for all war crimes, just as
an employee will be held liable for committing domestic
crimes, and the fact that the employer ordered him to commit
the crimes would be no defense? The answer is probably that
states do not want to go give soldiers an excuse for
insubordination. The rule balances the desire to deter soldiers
from engaging in war crimes, and the need to maintain
discipline on the field.88
While I agree with Posner and Sykes that crimes of obedience should be
examined using agency analysis, their examination of the issue, as the
discussion made hereinafter will show, is flawed. Posner and Sykes fall prey
to the same flaw that plagues the rest of the field. They attempt to balance
two public aims, the rule of law and military discipline, in an abstract manner
instead of determining how these considerations should be factored into an
agency analysis. When this concern is addressed at the outset, a detailed
agency analysis of the issue leads to a different conclusion than the one
reached by Posner and Sykes.
87
Scholarly writings on the subject have not been consistent in the names of the roles given
to each of the three participants in this relational structure. Usually in these analyses, the
corporation is dubbed as the principal and the lawmaker is treated as an external (but superior)
source of influence on the corporate agency relation. But see Mark A. Cohen, Optimal
Enforcement Strategy to Prevent Oil Spills: An Application of a Principal-Agent Model with
Moral Hazard, 30 J.L. & ECON. 23, 25 (1987) (explicitly dubbing the government as the
principal of the corporation).
88
Eric A. Posner & Alan O. Sykes, An Economic Analysis of State and Individual
Responsibility Under International Law, 9 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 72, 129 (2007).
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A crime is an act that the lawmaker wishes to prevent through the use of
penal law (i.e., an act harmful to the principal). A person will want to
commit a crime when the potential gains outweigh the potential losses.
Therefore, a lawmaker can deter an individual from committing a crime by
increasing the severity of the punishment or by increasing the probability that
an individual will be caught and convicted.89
A crime of obedience is an act that is harmful to the lawmaker and that is
committed as the result of a joint action by two agents: the commander who
issues the order, and the subordinate who physically commits the illegal act.
In the context of crimes of obedience, the gains against which individual
actors measure the potential costs of a crime may sometimes be societal, as
opposed to personal, gains. Soldiers often commit crimes wrongly believing
the illegal act will serve a greater good.90
If both subordinate and commander stand to gain equally from a crime
and have the same probability of being punished, then the same legal threat
of punishment can deter each of them from taking part in the crime.
Moreover, since a crime of obedience only occurs when both of them
participate, the lawmaker need only adopt a law that threatens to punish
either subordinate or commander. Furthermore, if the lawmaker is only
concerned with efficiency, she will be indifferent as to which individual the
law targets.91
Let us demonstrate this issue using the following example: (1) both the
soldier and commander are willing to commit a crime as long as they expect
to receive a term of imprisonment less than ten years; (2) for both parties, a
50% chance of being caught and convicted for a term of twenty years is as
much a deterrent as a certainty of being sentenced for ten years; (3) law
enforcement agencies have a 50% chance of catching and convicting either
party; and (4) once one party has been caught and convicted, there is a 100%
chance of catching and convicting the second party. Under these conditions,
the lawmaker needs to set a sentence of twenty years to ensure neither party
will participate in the crime of obedience. And, since only one party need be
deterred for a crime of obedience to be prevented, it is sufficient to threaten
either the subordinate or commander with a sentence of twenty years.
In reality, the analysis is not so neat, as substantial differences exist that
distinguish a subordinate’s cost-benefit analysis from that of a commander’s.
On one hand, disobeying an illegal order often harms the subordinate
89

E.g., Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of
Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 249 (1987).
90
See S.E. FINER, THE MAN ON HORSEBACK: THE ROLE OF THE MILITARY IN POLITICS 32–53
(2d ed. 1988).
91
Cf. Lewis A. Kornhauser, An Economic Analysis of the Choice Between Enterprise and
Personal Liability for Accidents, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1345, 1358–60 (1982).
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because a commander can sanction her for such behavior on-site.92 There is
thus an additional incentive for a subordinate to commit a crime of
obedience. Therefore, all else being equal, it will be harder to deter a
subordinate than a commander. On the other hand, because subordinates are
the ones that physically perform crimes of obedience, while commanders are
sometimes not even present during the commission of the crime, it is often
easier to catch and convict a subordinate.93 As a result, a law that addresses
only the commander suffers from an evidentiary deficit, which effects its
deterrence capabilities, that a law addressing either the subordinate, or both
the subordinate and the commander, does not.
Also, in reality, the lawmaker is limited in her ability to increase
punishment as a means to deter the commission of a crime. First, economic,
moral, and constitutional considerations generally limit the lawmaker’s
ability to do so. Without such limits, one can imagine a utilitarian lawmaker
instituting the death penalty as the punishment for all crimes.94 Second,
when setting the maximum penalty for each crime, the lawmaker must
consider whether the punishment set would sufficiently deter the commission
of the relevant crime regardless of whether individuals are acting under
orders. For example, murders are committed by both obedient soldiers and
individuals not acting under orders. Thus, the penalty set for murder needs
to deter both cases.95 To deal specifically with crimes of obedience, the
lawmaker will thus often need to supplement the general legal prohibition
92

Natasha Gonzalez, Moral Monsters or Ordinary Men Who Do Monstrous Things?
Psychological Dimensions of the Military and Their Implications for War Crimes Tribunal
Defenses 112 (June 2004) (unpublished Psy.D. dissertation, Widener University) (on file with
Widener University). Such sanctions can be formal or informal.
93
DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 237–38 (discussing this issue in the context of war crimes);
Jeffrey I. Ross, Controlling Crimes by the Military, in CONTROLLING STATE CRIME 115, 126–
27 (J.I. Ross ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing this issue in the context of domestic crimes).
94
See, e.g., Samuel Kramer, An Economic Analysis of Criminal Attempt: Marginal
Deterrence and the Optimal Structure of Sanctions, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 398, 404
(1990) (discussing negative enforcement costs as the reason harsh punishment is not
uniformly adopted for all crimes—the death penalty is the harshest punishment I can
imagine); Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DUKE L.J. 1, 20–22, 30–32 (implying a need to take
constitutional and moral considerations into account). For a general discussion of such
considerations not by law and economy scholars, see Stuart P. Green, Why It’s a Crime to
Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalization and the Moral Content of Regulatory
Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533 (1997) and FELICITY STEWART ET AL., SENT’G ADVISORY
COUNCIL – VICT. AUSTL., MAXIMUM PENALTIES: PRINCIPLES AND PURPOSES, at vii (2010). See
also sources cited infra note 96.
95
Supposedly, the lawmaker can create two sets of penal codes; one for crimes not
committed under orders, and the other for the same prohibited acts committed under orders. I
know of no legal system that has chosen such an option. It is most likely the costs that usually
accompany over-detailed legal policies have led lawmakers not to endorse such an option.
For a brief discussion of the costs of over-detailed legal policies, see infra Part V.A.2.
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with legal norms that deal specifically with this issue. These norms can take
the form of setting the act of giving or obeying an illegal order as a
mitigating, exculpating, or aggravating condition. However, when setting
such rules, the lawmaker will also be limited by moral and constitutional
considerations.96
Lastly, setting a law that addresses only the subordinate is not really an
option, as moral concerns should prevent lawmakers from adopting such a
policy. Even though subordinates physically commit the illegal acts, the
commander should be considered the main perpetrator of such crimes, both
because of the power she has over the subordinate and because the
commander issues the order in the first place. As such, as a general rule, the
commander should never be considered less culpable than the obedient
soldier.97 Therefore, it would be wrong for the lawmaker to adopt a legal
norm that punishes only the subordinate and not the commander, or punishes
the commander less severely than the subordinate. The options available to a
lawmaker are thus a legal policy that addresses only the commander, or a
policy that addresses both the commander and subordinate.
C. Command Responsibility Rule
A law targeting only commanders can be efficient only if the evidentiary
problem can be solved. This can be done by utilizing a strict-liabilitycommand-responsibility rule that holds the commander automatically
responsible for all illegal acts committed by her subordinates.98
In the context of many crimes of obedience, it is easier to find evidence
that a crime has been committed by soldiers of a specific unit than to find
96
Actual domestic criminal justice systems are based on a theoretical basis that combines
consequentialist and deontological rationales. E.g., Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Analysis in
Criminal Law, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 323, 326 (2004). That is also the case in international
criminal law. See Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 63. In such a system, as Coughlin stated,
“principles derived from one of the dominant theories attenuate the excesses that the other
would achieve in an undiluted form.” Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 9–10 (1994). Accordingly, the deontological principles place limits on the ability to
hold subordinates and commanders culpable for acts initiated by the other agent. See, e.g.,
text accompanying infra note 97 and the limits placed on command responsibility rules, infra
Part III.C.
97
Judgment in Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt Hospital Ship “Llandovery Castle,”
2 ANN. DIG. 436 (1921), reprinted in 16 AM. J. INT’L L. 708, 721, 723 (1922); Miriam GurArye, Commission of an Offence: Various Modes, 1 PLILIM 29, 47–49 (1990) (Heb.); see also
United States v. Duffy, 47 C.M.R. 658 (A.C.M.R. 1973) (finding the commander who orders
an act is a principal actor and not merely an accessory, and thus ruling the commander can be
convicted even when the obedient soldier is not).
98
Osiel, supra note 20, at 1113; Victor Hansen, What’s Good for the Goose is Good for the
Gander Lessons from Abu Ghraib: Time for the United States to Adopt a Standard of
Command Responsibility Towards Its Own, 42 GONZ. L. REV. 335, 347 (2007).
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evidence proving which individual soldier committed the criminal act.99 It is
even more difficult to prove the illegal act was ordered by a commander,
especially if the commander was not physically present during the
commission of the crime.100 Moreover, without the aid of the subordinates
who received the order it would often be extremely difficult to prove the
commander ordered the crime, and subordinates will not be incentivized to
implicate their commanders if the law does not also target subordinates.101
But, a strict-liability-command-responsibility rule solves this difficulty
because adopting such a rule would mean the aid of the subordinates would
no longer be required. This rule would make it easier to convict a
commander of a unit than it would be to convict any particular subordinate.
Yet from a deontological perspective, it is inappropriate to hold the
commander criminally responsible for the acts of her subordinates when her
direct involvement in the crime (e.g., giving the illegal order or participating
in the crime) has not been proven.102 The increasing influence of this
perspective on both domestic and international criminal law constrains
lawmakers’ ability to enact an efficient law that only addresses commanders.
Even in the context of war crimes, adopting a strict-liability-commandresponsibility rule is currently seen as unacceptable.103 For example,
according to the Rome Statute there is a need to prove: (1) the “military
commander . . . either knew or, owing to the circumstances at the time,
should have known that the forces were committing or about to commit such
crimes”;104 and (2) the “military commander . . . failed to take all necessary
and reasonable measures within his or her power to prevent or repress their
commission or to submit the matter to the competent authorities for
investigation and prosecution.”105
Because currently a lawmaker is barred from adopting a command
responsibility rule harsher than the one just stated, she should not adopt a
99
E.g., Prosecutor v. Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-68-A, Appeal Judgment, ¶ 189 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 3, 2008).
100
See sources cited supra note 93.
101
See White, supra note 21, at 61; Ray Murphy, Gravity Issues and the International
Criminal Court, 17 CRIM. L. F. 281, 312 (2006) (arguing the ICTY’s prosecution of lowerranking soldiers ultimately led to prosecution of higher ranking individuals).
102
See KWAME ANTHONY APPIAH, THINKING IT THROUGH: AN INTRODUCTION TO
CONTEMPORARY PHILOSOPHY 288–89 (2003) (discussing the readiness of utilitarian views, and
the objection of deontological views, to punish uninvolved individuals).
103
Osiel, supra note 20, at 1064; Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty
Associations: Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of
International Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. passim (2005); see also Prosecutor v. JeanPaul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Judgment, ¶¶ 488–489 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Sept. 2, 1998).
104
Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 28(a)(i).
105
Id. art. 28(a)(ii); see also Jean-Paul Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, ¶¶ 488–491
(recognizing the potential for an even more restrictive rule for civilian superiors).
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policy that only addresses commanders. Instead, in addition to adopting the
“permitted” command responsibility rule, the lawmaker should also adopt a
rule that will be addressed to the obedient soldier. The experience of legal
systems that adopted this latter policy indicates that it can attain greater
crime prevention than the former one. As past cases in such legal systems
indicate106 the likelihood of successfully convicting a commander on the
basis of the “permitted” command responsibility rule is, at least sometimes,
lower than the likelihood of successfully convicting subordinates for being
directly involved in the commission of the crime (because as previously
discussed, it is sometimes easier to find evidence against subordinates).
The deontological perspective has further influenced the field by lowering
the socially acceptable level of punishment in cases where direct
involvement of the commander has not been proven.107 This effect is less
apparent in prosecutions of war crimes in international tribunals, since the
statutes of such tribunals usually include a single maximum penalty for all
international crimes.108 Yet in domestic law, the deontological perspective
has already had a substantial effect. It is most significant in the context of
domestic crimes committed outside of war. With regard to such crimes,
penal sanctions are generally considered inappropriate unless direct
involvement of the commander in the crime is stipulated. That is, in cases
dealing with indirect involvement of a commander in the crime (i.e., cases
where just a commander’s failure to know or prevent a subordinate’s crime is
alleged) only administrative and disciplinary sanctions, and not the harsher
penal ones, are considered appropriate.109 Moreover, even in the context of
domestic, war-related crimes, if no direct involvement in the crime is proven,
the maximum penalty a commander can receive is, usually, substantially
lower than the maximum penalty for the war-related crime itself.110
106

E.g., Naser Orić, Case No. IT-03-63-A, ¶ 189. Furthermore, compare the conviction of
subordinate Calley, in the context of the My Lai massacre, United States v. Calley, 48 C.M.R. 19
(C.M.A. 1973), with the acquittal of superior Medina as discussed in Natalia M. Restivo, Defense
of Superior Orders in International Criminal Law as Portrayed in Three Trials: Eichmann, Calley
and England (Sept. 12, 2006) (graduate student paper, Cornell Law School), available at http://
schoolarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1035&context=lps_papers.
107
See Danner & Martinez, supra note 103, at 99–100 (noting that, in the context of the law
of command responsibility, a demand exists for the application of culpability principles that
ensure individuals are convicted because they had a role in the commission of the crime, not
just because a crime occurred).
108
Jennifer Clark, Zero to Life: Sentencing Appeals at the International Criminal Tribunals
for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 96 GEO. L.J. 1685, 1688–89 (2008).
109
IAN LEIGH & HANS BORN, ORG. FOR SEC. AND COOPERATION IN EUR., HANDBOOK ON
HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS OF ARMED FORCES PERSONNEL 211, 214
(2008).
110
See Amy J. Sepinwall, Failures to Punish: Command Responsibility in Domestic and
International Law, 30 MICH. J. INT’L L. 251, 275 (2009) (comparing the Uniform Code of
Military Justice’s six month maximum penalty for a commander’s dereliction of duty with
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Trends in domestic law also have substantial effects on international
criminal law, since many war crimes are prosecuted by domestic courts.111
Often in these domestic prosecutions, the individual is formally charged with
violating a domestic offense that is an analogue of an international offense.112
In the United States for example, commanders who fail to know about and
prevent war crimes committed by subordinates are usually prosecuted in
domestic courts martial for “dereliction of duty,” which carries a much lower
maximum penalty than that of any war crime.113 Because of this difference
in the permitted harshness of maximum penalties, the lawmaker is limited in
her ability to rely on a command responsibility rule as a means to deter
crimes of obedience. Thus, although the law should target commanders and
apply a command responsibility rule to the extent permitted, it will generally
be more effective for the law to also target the subordinate.
D. Agency Analysis of the Five Commonly Endorsed Approaches
1.
Equal Liability, Respondeat Superior, and Reduced Sentence
Approaches
There are several alternatives for a legal approach that addresses both
subordinates and commanders. One such alternative is the equal liability
approach, which sets the same level of culpability for both commanders and
subordinates for their direct involvement in the commission of a crime of
obedience.114 This approach will deter subordinates, in some situations, from
obeying illegal orders even when the penalty for the crime, or the
commanders’ probability of being caught and convicted, would not deter
commanders from issuing such orders. Because subordinates physically

federal law’s twenty or thirty year penalties for war crimes). In Israeli law, for example, the
main way to hold a commander liable for the acts of her subordinates is to charge her with the
military offense of “Failure to Prevent an Offence.” In the past, the maximum penalty for a
commander convicted of such an offense was half the maximum penalty for the offense she
failed to prevent. See Art. 74 of the Emergency Regulations (Military Justice Constitution) of
1948, 20 Official Paper, 2d appendix 105 (Isr.). Currently, the maximum penalty still cannot
be more than half the maximum penalty for the offense the commander failed to prevent. Yet,
additionally, the sentence for the failure to prevent most offenses cannot exceed three years.
See Military Justice Act, 5715-1955, SH. No. 171, art. 134 (Isr.).
111
Joseph Rikhof, Fewer Places to Hide? The Impact of Domestic War Crimes Prosecutions
on International Impunity, 20 CRIM. L. F. 1, 51 (2009).
112
See Knut Dörmann & Robin Geiβ, The Implementation of Grave Breaches into Domestic
Legal Orders, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 703, 709–10 (2009) (noting that most countries have
constitutional prohibitions against criminal sanctions based solely on international law, thus
requiring a domestic basis for punishment); see also Rikhof, supra note 111, at 15 n.61.
113
Sepinwall, supra note 110, at 275.
114
See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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perform the crime,115 it will sometimes be easier to find evidence sufficient
to convict the subordinate for her direct involvement in the crime than it
would be to convict a commander, even under a command responsibility rule
and even though the latter rule does not require proof of direct involvement.
Thus, the equal liability approach, by holding both the commander and
subordinate responsible, can prevent crimes of obedience that would be
committed under a law that addresses only the commander.116 Some argue
this has been the reason for the application of this approach in international
law following World War II. As M.C. Bassiouni states, “it became clear
after World War II that holding only the superiors responsible would not
accomplish the goals of deterrence and prevention. Consequently, a new
policy approach was developed whereby those carrying out unlawful orders
would be held criminally accountable, in addition to those who issued the
orders.”117
Another alternative is the respondeat superior approach, which allows the
subordinate to always benefit from a superior orders defense while holding
the commander responsible.118 Under the respondent superior approach, a
soldier is not likely to be deterred from obeying illegal orders, since she
could avoid punishment and enjoy a superior orders defense simply by
showing the act was a crime of obedience.119 But, this approach could deter
commanders from giving illegal orders more effectively than a law that only
addresses commanders. It would incentivize soldiers to implicate their

115

See sources cited supra note 93.
See BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 586 (noting that the humanitarian goals of deterring and
preventing harm to protected targets cannot be accomplished by holding only superiors
responsible).
117
Id.
118
See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
119
This approach, in the way it was applied in the past, threatened the subordinate with
punishment for disobeying any illegal order. See id. But even without such a threat, a
subordinate soldier is unlikely to be deterred from obeying illegal orders under a respondeat
superior approach since she could avoid punishment by showing the crime was a crime of
obedience. It is true that such a policy places some burden of production of evidence on the
subordinate, whether formally, or simply because she has an incentive to do so. Thus, one can
imagine a situation in which: (1) a subordinate knows she has a high probability of getting
caught and convicted; and (2) she further knows that if caught she will have no ability to show
the act was ordered by her commander. In such a situation, even under a respondeat superior
approach, the subordinate may still disobey. Yet, these situations are likely to be rare for two
reasons. First, due to moral and constitutional considerations, the burden of proof a lawmaker
can demand from a subordinate is much lower than demanding her to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt the act was ordered by her commander. See ROBINSON, supra note 17, at
209; GEERT-JAN KNOOPS, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 259–
61 (2d ed. 2007) (articulating the relevant burden of proof). Second, the subordinate will
often have at least some evidence implicating the commander. See Ross, supra note 93, at
126–27; White, supra note 21, at 61; Murphy, supra note 101, at 312.
116
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commanders, thus increasing the probability commanders would be caught
and convicted.120
In some situations, the respondeat superior approach can more effectively
deter crimes of obedience than the equal liability approach. For example, as
previously discussed, the lawmaker often will not be able to successfully
deter a commander as well as she is able to deter a subordinate, due to a
difference in the probability of getting caught and convicted.121 Let us
further assume two things: (1) the lawmaker cannot further increase the
maximum punishment for the crime as a means of deterrence;122 and (2) due
to budgetary or other such limitations, the lawmaker is unable to rely on the
efforts of law enforcement agencies as a means of increasing the probability
of catching crimes of obedience.123 Thus, we can expect situations will exist
in which, under the equal liability approach, both the subordinate and the
commander will not be deterred, and the lawmaker will not be able to use
increases in penalties or law-enforcement efforts to increase deterrence.
In some of these cases, choosing the respondeat superior approach over
the equal liability approach can increase deterrence. While switching to the
respondeat superior approach will not change the behavior of the subordinate
(since she is likely to obey illegal orders when the lawmaker adopts the
respondeat superior approach) adopting the respondeat superior approach can
increase deterrence against the commander. Under the equal liability
approach the subordinate does not have an incentive to implicate the
commander, since it will not have any effect on her fate. On the other hand,
under the respondeat superior approach, she has a strong incentive to
implicate her commander. She could assert a superior orders defense by
showing her action was a crime of obedience, thereby avoiding punishment.
The evidence supplied by the subordinate can then be used against the
commander, increasing the probability of the commander being implicated
and convicted.124 This increased probability will, at least sometimes, be
120
See Ross, supra note 93, at 126–27; White, supra note 21, at 61 (discussing the
consequential effects of prosecuting lower ranking soldiers).
121
See supra Part III.C (discussing the command responsibility rule).
122
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 77 (establishing maximum penalties for
crimes). Moreover, as previously discussed, there are different considerations that limit the
ability of the lawmaker to use punishment to deter crimes in general, and crimes of obedience
specifically. See sources cited supra notes 94, 96–97 & Part III.C.
123
This is a very realistic assumption. See Robert J. Sampson & Jacqueline Cohen,
Deterrent Effects of the Police on Crime: A Replication and Theoretical Extension, 22 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 163, 185 (1988) (“[T]he criminal justice system may [sometimes] be able to do
very little in terms of changing actual probabilities of arrests for crimes. . . .”).
124
The evidence could be used at the commander’s trial to prove she ordered the crimes.
Moreover, even if the evidence will not be sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the
commander ordered the crimes, we can assume they will make it easier to show the
commander knew, or should have known, about the crimes, or that she failed to prevent them.
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sufficient to deter the commander from ordering the crime in the first place.
Thus, situations exist in which the respondeat superior approach will prevent
crimes more efficiently than the equal liability approach.125
However, the respondeat superior approach will not always be more
effective than the equal liability approach. Many situations can be found in
which threatening the subordinate with punishment will deter her from
obeying the illegal order. In some of these situations, a commander will not
be deterred by either the equal liability or the respondeat superior approach.
In other words, in some of these situations, even the increased probability of
detection and conviction of the commander under the respondeat superior
approach will be insufficient to deter her.
United States v. Calley, a case arising out of the My Lai Massacre,
provides a convenient example for illustrating these situations.126 In Calley,
the subordinate alleged that he committed the acts under orders from his
superior, Medina.127 His claim was sufficiently robust so that, at trial, the
jury was instructed to consider whether Calley is eligible for a superior
orders defense.128 Further, there is a strong possibility the jury was
convinced Calley had obeyed such orders.129 However, despite the evidence
supplied by Calley, at Medina’s trial the prosecution failed to prove that
Medina gave the orders, or that Medina even knew or should have known
that his subordinates committed the crimes.130 This case thus indicates that
situations can be found where: (1) it will be easier to prove the direct
involvement of a subordinate than to prove either the direct or indirect
125
The likelihood of such situations is high because a subordinate has an additional
incentive to commit the crime that the commander does not have; the fear of being sanctioned
by her commander for disobedience. See Gonzalez, supra note 92. Thus all else being equal,
it will be harder to deter subordinates from obeying illegal orders than it will be to deter
commanding officers from issuing them.
126
22 U.S.C.M.A. 534 (C.M.A. 1973).
127
Id. at 538 (“Asked if women and children were to be killed, Medina said he replied in the
negative. . . . However, Lieutenant Calley testified that Captain Medina informed the troops
they were to kill every living thing. . . .”).
128
At trial, evidence supporting both Medina’s and Calley’s claims was presented. The trial
judge instructed the jury “unless you find beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not acting
under orders . . . you must determine whether Lieutenant Calley” knew or should have known
the orders were illegal. Id. at 542.
129
The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Georgia, ruling on a habeas corpus
petition presented by Calley, determined it is very likely the jury was improperly influenced by
news reports to decide Medina did not give the orders. Calley v. Callaway, 382 F. Supp. 650,
685–86 (M.D. Ga. 1974). Yet on appeal that decision was overturned, and the Fifth Circuit
affirmed prior rulings of the military courts that found a strong possibility the jury concluded
Calley had received the orders from Medina, yet decided to convict regardless. Calley v.
Callaway, 519 F.2d 184, 193–94 (5th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he military jury could have found either
that the alleged order to kill was not issued, or, if it was, that the order was not a defense to the
charges. The military courts found ample evidence to support either hypothesis.”).
130
Restivo, supra note 106, at 18–19.
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involvement of a commander; and (2) a commander may not be convicted or
deterred even given an incentive structure that encourages subordinates to
implicate their commanders.
In other words, there is a tradeoff between the respondeat superior
approach and the equal liability approach. When crime prevention is more
likely to be achieved by a policy focused on attempts to deter the
commander, the respondeat superior approach will be more efficient. On the
other hand, when crime prevention is more likely to be achieved by a policy
focused on attempts to deter the subordinate, the equal liability approach will
be more efficient.
An alternative approach exists, however, that can act as a better deterrent
than either approach. Until now, we have assumed that a soldier will only
implicate her commander if she receives full protection from punishment
through a superior orders defense. In reality however, the commander only
has a modest ability to pressure a soldier who has already been caught
because the prosecuting authority can often protect the subordinate by
removing her or the commander from the unit, or taking other protective
measures.131 As such, a very small incentive will often suffice to convince
the soldier to implicate her superior.132
Thus, a reduced sentence approach that offers a soldier the smallest
sentence reduction possible to encourage her to implicate her commander has
the advantages of both the equal liability and the respondeat superior
approaches. Commanders would be deterred, just as they would under the
respondeat superior approach, because subordinates would still be
incentivized to implicate them. Moreover, the deterrent effect of each
additional day in prison is likely to be less than that of the previous day.
Accordingly, a small sentence reduction is not likely to have a significant
influence on the law’s deterrent effect on subordinates. Thus, the deterrent
effect the reduced sentence approach has on a subordinate is almost identical
to the deterrent effect of the equal liability approach.133
131

E.g., DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REG. 27-10, MILITARY JUSTICE (2011), available at
http://www.apd.army.mil/pdffiles/r27_10.pdf (discussing means available to protect soldiers
who are witnesses).
132
Cf. Ada Kewley, Murder and the Availability of the Defence of Duress in the Criminal
Law, 57 J. CRIM. L. 298, 299 (1993) (stating with regard to the duress defense: “[g]enerally, it
should be noted that the defence is not available where the defendant has a realistic
opportunity to seek official protection”).
133
Cf. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, On the Disutility and Discounting of
Imprisonment and the Theory of Deterrence, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3–4 (1999) (arguing it is
likely that the deterrent effect of each additional day in prison is less than that of the previous
day, thus plea bargains are unlikely to reduce deterrence); Andreas Reindl, Background Note,
in ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., DAF/COMP(2007)38, POLICY ROUNDTABLES: PLEA
BARGAINING 21, 43 (2007) (arguing that if the prosecuting authority is able to exert strict
sanctions in plea bargain agreements, which it is if there is a credible threat of sanctions at

2012]

THE SUPERIOR ORDERS DEFENSE

31

Despite these benefits, the reduced sentence approach should not be
applied in every situation. The reduced sentence approach requires the
subordinate soldier to recognize illegal orders and disobey them (otherwise
she would be held criminally responsible). In reality, soldiers do not have
perfect knowledge of the law. Therefore, a duty to disobey illegal orders
may lead to two kinds of mistakes: (1) the soldier might mistakenly obey
illegal orders, thinking they are legal; or (2) she may mistakenly disobey
legal orders, thinking they are illegal. In comparison, when a subordinate is
afforded a superior orders defense, such as under the respondeat superior
approach, it is unlikely the subordinate will disobey orders regardless of their
legality, and similar concerns about mistakes do not exist.
Thus, the likelihood a subordinate will make a mistake has an effect on
whether the reduced sentence rule should be adopted as opposed to an
approach that affords a superior orders defense. The greater the possibility
subordinates will mistakenly obey illegal orders, the less there is a crime
prevention benefit from adopting a reduced sentence rule. Furthermore, a
reduced sentence rule can encourage a soldier to mistakenly disobey legal
orders, which is harmful to the lawmaker when she benefits from the
performance of legal military actions.134
Thus, when the gains (i.e., the crime prevention achieved by obligating
the soldier to disobey orders she thinks are illegal) will be smaller than the
harm caused by mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders, a reduced
sentence approach should not be adopted. Instead, the subordinate should be
encouraged to obey orders she thinks are illegal, by way of affording her a
superior orders defense.
2. Agency Analysis of Conditional Liability Approaches
By demonstrating that neither affording a superior orders defense nor
applying a reduced sentence approach will always maximize a lawmaker’s
utility, agency analysis has shown the appropriate solution is an intermediate
one. This Section thus examines whether either of the two commonly
endorsed conditional liability approaches should be adopted (i.e., the factual
approach and the normative approach) since both of these approaches
advance an intermediate solution.
Both the reduced sentence approach and the factual conditional liability
approach instruct subordinates to disobey any order they believe is illegal.135
Yet, each approach has a different effect on a subordinate’s behavior. As
previously stated, soldiers do not have perfect knowledge of the law. Under
trial, plea bargains are unlikely to reduce deterrence).
134
Osiel, supra note 20, at 967.
135
See supra note 39.
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both approaches, a soldier will be punished if she mistakenly disobeys a legal
order. The two approaches differ in how they treat a soldier who mistakenly
obeys an illegal order. The reduced sentence approach calls for the
punishment of such a soldier, whereas the factual approach allows for the
acquittal of a soldier whose mistaken obedience is deemed reasonable. Thus,
a higher threshold of doubt is attached to the factual approach than is
attached to the reduced sentence approach. Under the factual approach, a
soldier will only disobey when she thinks it is relatively clear an order is
illegal, while under the reduced sentence approach, the soldier will tend to
disobey even when she is less certain about an order’s legality.
But how certain a soldier is that an order is illegal, and the probability
that her assessment is correct, are two very different issues.136 To say that a
soldier is 90% sure an order is illegal, is not the same as saying that 90% of
the times in which she receives orders similar to the order just received, such
orders will be illegal. Therefore, the factual approach encourages a soldier to
obey in cases of doubt more frequently than the respondeat superior
approach, and yet it often does not increase the accuracy of the soldier’s
determinations. Thus, situations exist in which the reduced sentence
approach will better serve the lawmaker, even though it will increase
mistaken acts of disobedience.
Other situations also exist where, even under the factual approach,
mistakenly disobeying legal orders will lead to great harm. The probability
that a soldier might mistakenly disobey legal orders, even under a factual
approach, is relatively high in certain military situations, especially during
combat. Because a commander has more expertise than a subordinate, as
well as more access to sensitive information, a factual approach will often
elicit “disobedience to orders that appear wrongful from the soldier’s
restricted perspective but which are actually justified by larger operational
circumstances.”137 Thus, we can imagine cases where the factual approach
will lead to harm caused by mistaken acts of disobedience, which will
outweigh the crime prevention benefits it might otherwise offer the
lawmaker. In these cases, the lawmaker should adopt an approach that
further encourages a subordinate to obey orders she suspects are illegal. The
normative approach is one such approach.
Unlike the factual approach, the normative approach is an intermediate
solution that does not instruct the subordinate to disobey all illegal orders;
instead it instructs her to obey some, but only some, illegal orders. That is, it
136
Joseph Raz, Facing Up: A Reply, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1153, 1195 (1989) (discussing limits
on deference to authority).
137
OSIEL, supra note 10, at 64; see also Richard A. Wasserstrom, Individual Responsibility
in Warfare, in LAW AND RESPONSIBILITY IN WARFARE: THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE 194, 195,
202 (Peter D. Trooboff ed., 1975).
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instructs subordinates to disobey only when an order is both illegal and
grossly immoral.138 Supporters of this approach assume most soldiers can
recognize when an order is both illegal and immoral, and thus this approach
reduces the chance subordinates will mistakenly disobey legal orders while
also increasing the accuracy of the soldiers’ determinations of an order’s
legality.139 Yet, this is often not the case. In many combat situations, the
subordinate either does not have sufficient expertise or access to all the
necessary information needed to evaluate the situation. Thus, “[a]n act that
seems to the uninformed as manifestly wrong may actually be morally
justified.”140 Therefore, like under the factual approach, there will be
situations in which the harm from mistaken acts of disobedience to legal
orders will still be too high, and a way needs to be found that further restricts
subordinates’ discretion.
Supporters of the normative approach also claim it sufficiently reduces
the harm caused by crimes of obedience because of its prohibition against
committing grossly immoral illegal acts.141 As such, the most harmful
crimes of obedience are prevented, while the harm caused if soldiers are
further encouraged to disobey orders they suspect are illegal is also averted.
However, this premise is not always true, and the lawmaker’s utility (i.e., the
balance between the crime prevention gains, on the one hand, and the harm
caused by mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders, on the other) will
sometimes be better served if the subordinate is instructed to disobey orders
she suspects are illegal even if they are not grossly immoral.
For example, in an Israeli court martial dubbed “The Bread Case,” the
following domestic-law scenario was dealt with: a soldier and a commander
were delivering bread when the commander gave the soldier an illegal order
to throw seventy-eight loaves of bread to the side of the road so they could
go home early.142 While such an order is not grossly immoral, subordinates
can easily recognize it is illegal and are not likely to confuse such an illegal
order with any legal order. Therefore, the approach adopted in this instance
should instruct soldiers to disobey the order even if it is not grossly immoral,
which is exactly what the Israel court martial did.143
138

See supra notes 36–37 and accompanying text.
See sources cited supra notes 36–37.
140
Barak Medina, Political Disobedience in the IDF: The Scope of the Legal Rights of
Soldiers to Be Excused From Taking Part in Military Activities in the Occupied Territories, 36
ISR. L. REV. 73, 82 (2002).
141
See supra notes 36–37.
142
Mil. Appeal/15/65 Chief Military Prosecutor v. Gil & Hadar, 1965 PDZ 28 (Isr.).
143
Id. at 30 (ruling that an illegal order, given in order to serve a private end of a commander,
should always be disobeyed). A similar rule has been adopted in many other legal systems. See,
e.g., 2008 MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, supra note 39, art. 90(c)(2)(a)(iv) (United States);
LEIGH & BORN, supra note 109, at 213 (Belgium and Lithuania); Sahir Erman, Compliance with
Superior Orders Under Domestic Criminal Law and Under the Law of War, 10 MIL. L. & L.
139
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In sum, agency analysis indicates that supporters of any of the commonly
endorsed approaches were wrong in advancing a one-rule-fits-all application
of their preferred approach. If the relationship between crime prevention
(i.e., rule of law) and the benefits to the lawmaker from a well-functioning
armed force (i.e., military discipline) is examined in a less abstract manner
than a single balancing test, the conclusion that should be reached is that
none of these approaches is preferable in all situations. Between adopting a
reduced sentence norm and the alternative of adopting a superior orders
defense, each legal policy will only sometimes be preferable to the other.
Furthermore, a respondeat superior norm should not be endorsed in every
situation in which a reduced sentence norm should not be applied. Instead, in
many situations an intermediate solution should be adopted. Yet, the kind of
intermediate solution that should be adopted differs according to the
individual situation. Thus, the findings of agency analysis have a further
reaching implication; indicating that the core premise of current legal
discourse—regulation through a one-rule-fits-all policy—is flawed.
IV. ANY ONE-RULE-FITS-ALL POLICY IS INAPPROPRIATE: FURTHER
INDICATIONS
Agency analysis indicates no single approach is preferable in all
situations. This Part further strengthens that conclusion. First, it examines
claims that there are reasons, other than efficiency concerns, to adopt a
conditional liability approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy. Second, it
addresses the argument that it is especially appropriate to adopt a reduced
sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy in the realm of international
law. Lastly, it points out that not all laws that an order can violate are cut
from the same cloth; an element that has been ignored in the current
discourse. This element serves as a further indication the issue should not be
regulated through a one-rule-fits-all policy.
A. Agency Analysis, Excusatory Considerations, and Conditional Liability
Approaches
We return to the question that opened this Article. Why, and when, do we
want to give soldiers the opportunity to raise a superior orders defense? Is this
defense useful only because there are situations in which adopting it would
maximize a lawmaker’s utility? Or, do we wish to also acknowledge the
difficulty soldiers face when they are given an order and need to decide
whether to obey or disobey? This latter reason suggests we should take into
WAR REV. 371, 398–99 (1971) (Germany and Sweden).
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account considerations other than efficiency; namely, the types of
considerations that allow for excuse defenses (“excusatory considerations”).144
According to many views, in particular deontological ones, excuse
defenses should sometimes be adopted even in cases where applying such a
defense will not serve the lawmaker’s utility.145 Thus, if excusatory
considerations mandate the adoption of a one-rule-fits-all policy, the
conclusions of the agency analysis may be superfluous. In other words, we
must determine whether an excuse defense must be set in all situations,
which would mandate the adoption of a different approach than that
suggested by the agency analysis. This Subsection will examine the
excusatory considerations relevant to crimes of obedience in a less abstract
manner than they are currently examined, as well as the relationship between
these considerations and the conclusions of the agency analysis. This
examination will help us determine whether these excusatory considerations
support the adoption of a one-rule-fits-all policy, or whether they supply
further evidence against regulating obedience to orders in such a manner.
1. Mistake of Law and the Factual Approach
One category of situations in which many agree that an excuse defense
should be afforded is when a person violates the law due to a reasonable
mistake made following an order of a governmental official.146 Adopting
such a defense allows courts in each case to separately examine the
culpability of individuals who followed illegal orders, and to make discrete
findings that a person should not be held culpable when: (1) she thought the
order was legal; and (2) that mistake was reasonable. It is often argued the
factual approach should be adopted in the context of obedient soldiers, as it
adapts this more general mistake of law defense to the unique conditions of
the military.147 If this argument were true, then agency analysis sheds no
light on the issue, as there will always be an excusatory consideration
obligating the adoption of the factual approach. That is, there is an
144

See supra note 22 (explaining excusatory considerations).
According to deontological views that strongly influence criminal law jurisprudence, when
it is unjust to hold a person culpable a criminal law excuse defense should be afforded, even if
doing so does not serve the lawmaker’s utility. See sources cited supra notes 96, 101.
Moreover, many consequentialist views, other than strict utilitarianism, will also support excuse
defenses in such cases. See Antony Duff, Legal Punishment, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
PHILOSOPHY (Edward N. Zalta ed., 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/lega
l-punishment.
146
See Re’em Segev, Justification, Rationality and Mistake: Mistake of Law Is No Excuse?
It Might Be a Justification!, 25 L. & PHIL. 31, 32 n.3 (2006) (noting the obviousness and
general consensus of this view).
147
E.g., WILLIAMS, supra note 54, at 297; Stanley Yeo, Mistakenly Obeying Unlawful
Superior Orders, 5 BOND L. REV. 1, 15 (1993).
145
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excusatory aim that obligates the lawmaker to allow courts to conduct a caseby-case examination of subordinates’ culpability, by examining whether (a)
the individual subordinate soldier thought the order was legal; and whether
(b) her specific mistake was reasonable.
However, this argument is false. There are certain categories of situations
in which, even from a deontological point of view, the lawmaker can choose
to bar such individual judicial determinations.148 These situations are ones in
which there is a moral justification allowing the lawmaker to place a person
under a duty to learn the law.149 There are two main categories of these
situations.
First, it is commonly accepted that all individuals are expected to know
and learn certain core moral rules that are protected by specific legal
prohibitions.150 Therefore, a mistake of law defense can be barred in cases
where orders have led to violations of such norms. For example, individuals
who obey orders of governmental officials to commit murder will generally
be barred from raising a mistake of law defense. Not only is it unlikely that
individuals will fail to realize such an order is illegal, or that any mistake will
not be unreasonable, but allowing individuals to rely on a mistake of law
defense is fundamentally inappropriate. “Instead of treating individuals as
moral agents capable of and responsible for knowing and weighing desirable
moral values and choices . . . allowing the defense in these situations
encourages us to cede our moral agency to the state.”151
Second, in areas which require professional expertise, it is considered
morally appropriate to deny professionals the same mistake of law defense
afforded to laymen, since it is an expert’s duty to learn the legal norms
regulating her profession.152 For example, an accountant should not enjoy
the same mistake of law defense a layman would be able to enjoy for taxrelated crimes because she has a duty to know the relevant law.153 And
policemen, it is often argued, cannot enjoy a superior orders defense, even of
the kind afforded by the factual approach (i.e., they cannot enjoy a mistake
of law defense for reasonable mistakes made following illegal orders of their
superiors) because of policemen’s duty to learn and know the law.154
148
See John T. Parry, Culpability, Mistake, and Official Interpretations of Law, 25 AM. J.
CRIM. L. 1, 24–25 (1997) (listing reasons why reliance defense should not be allowed in
situations that violate central moral values).
149
Id.
150
Id. at 25.
151
Id. at 26.
152
John Kaplan, Mistake of Law, in 2 JUSTIFICATION AND EXCUSE: COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 1125, 1140–45 (1988).
153
E.g., United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854, 863 (2d Cir. 1964).
154
Doern v. Police Complaint Comm’r, 2001 CarswellBC 1414, ¶ 20 (Can. B.C.C.A.)
(WL); United States v. Konovsky, 202 F.2d 721, 730–31 (7th Cir. 1953); Brannan v. Peek
[1948] 1 K.B. 68, at 72 (Eng.). For the realm of torts, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
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The existence of these categories demonstrates there are instances in
which the factual approach need not be adopted. First, with respect to certain
specific acts, it is morally justifiable to mandate all soldiers know that such
acts are illegal, either because of their professional duties or because such
acts are obviously immoral. Second, high ranking officers, as professional
soldiers, can be mandated to learn the legal norms that regulate their
profession. In these two categories of situations, there is no reason to adopt a
factual approach, and a lawmaker is thus free to determine whether to apply
another approach based on the agency analysis’ conclusions.155
Furthermore, there is also a category of situations in which the factual
approach should not be adopted, even if excusatory considerations are taken
into account. Imagine a situation where the agency analysis leads to the
conclusion that a normative approach should be adopted. In such situations,
if this approach, which affords a more extensive defense, is adopted instead
of the factual approach, the only difference is that even those soldiers who
knowingly obeyed an illegal order, which is not grossly immoral, will also
not be prosecuted. Thus, adopting a more extensive defense will still shield
those obedient soldiers who have a valid mistake of law excuse defense.
Therefore, the existence of this excusatory consideration does not
inevitably lead to the conclusion that the factual approach should be adopted
in all situations. This consideration and not the conclusions of the agency
analysis should determine the content of the law dealing with obedience to
orders only in the limited situations where (1) this consideration is relevant
but (2) the agency analysis supports adopting a reduced sentence approach
(i.e., the only approach more restrictive than the factual approach that is
likely to sometimes serve a lawmaker’s utility). Moreover, the fact that this
excusatory consideration is only relevant in some crimes of obedience

§ 121 cmt. i (1965) (“[N]o protection is given to a peace officer who, however reasonably,
acts under a mistake of law other than a mistake as to the validity of a statute or ordinance.”).
155
Deontological perspectives do not endorse ignoring the consequences of a conduct rule.
Rather, they argue that a norm should be adopted despite possible harmful consequences if,
and only if, a strong deontological value exists that trumps the need to take into account such
consequences. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 26–27 (1971). It should be noted that
with regard to the first category in which the defense is barred (i.e., violations of core moral
values), some deontological perspectives will sometimes argue there is a duty to punish the
obedient subordinate soldier. See Douglas N. Husak, Malum Prohibitum and Retributivism, in
PHILOSOPHY OF CRIMINAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 410, 423 (2010) (stating that some versions
of retribution insist that each and every perpetrator of a moral wrong must be punished);
Henry M. Hart Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 413
(1958) (giving the following as the rationale for baring the mistake of law defense from being
applied in the context of crimes that prohibit the violation of core moral norms: “[f]or any
member of the community who does these things without knowing that they are criminal is
blameworthy, as much for his lack of knowledge as for his actual conduct.”).
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further indicates it is improper to regulate all crimes of obedience through a
one-rule-fits-all policy.
2. Psychological Coercion and the Normative Approach
Soldiers may face strong psychological pressure to obey orders, which
has been well documented by psychological studies.156 In particular, Stanley
Milgram conducted an experiment where subjects were instructed to provide
shocks to a man every time he made a mistake.157 All of the subjects ended
up following the instructor’s commands to give increasingly severe shocks to
the man, up to 300 volts, even when the man writhed and kicked the wall in
pain (the man was an actor and did not actually receive electric shocks, but
subjects were not aware of this fact).158 Sixty-five percent of the subjects
used the maximum voltage, at which point they were led to believe the man
had lost consciousness.159
This research indicates individuals are, at least sometimes, conditioned to
obey orders, even if they demand the commission of wrongful acts.160
Moreover, research further indicates military conditions often uniquely
promote this conditioned behavior of obedience.161 Thus, many agree that
the coercive pressures a soldier faces should be taken into account when
formulating a law to deal with crimes of obedience.162 The attempt to
balance the coercive pressures a soldier faces against the rule of law has led
some to support the normative approach.163 Furthermore, at first glance the
research seems to support the adoption of the normative approach, since it
indicates an individual is less likely to obey an order when it contradicts her
moral values,164 especially if the act ordered is both illegal and immoral.165
156
See Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCHOL.
371 (1963) (presenting Milgram’s seminal research on obedience); HERBERT C. KELMAN & V.
LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORITY AND
RESPONSIBILITY 146–66 (1989) (discussing the psychological researches examining the issue
of obedience).
157
Milgram, supra note 156, at 373–74.
158
Id. at 375–76.
159
Id. at 374.
160
STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY: AN EXPERIMENTAL VIEW 205 (1974).
161
JEAN-JACQUES FRÉSARD, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOUR IN WAR: A SURVEY OF THE
LITERATURE 82–86 (2004); Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 92–155.
162
E.g., Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 156–65; see also V. Lee Hamilton, Intuitive
Psychologist or Intuitive Lawyer? Alternative Models of the Attribution Process, 39 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 767, 771 (1980) (arguing for greater legal recognition of
research demonstrating human propensity for obedience).
163
Gerry J. Simpson, Didactic and Dissident Histories in War Crimes Trials, 60 ALB. L.
REV. 801, 817–18 (1997) (stating this policy is commonly endorsed by prosecutors).
164
KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 156, at 92.
165
Legally backing the moral norm reduces the likelihood that a psychological process of
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This seemingly leads to the conclusion there is always an excusatory aim
that obligates the adoption of the normative approach. However, research
reveals the strength of the coercive effect of orders varies among different
situations. During emergency situations psychological factors that increase
the tendency for conditioned obedience are much stronger than in nonemergency situations.166 Furthermore, there is a correlation between the
tendency to obey and the strictness of military discipline demanded from a
soldier. That is, the tendency for conditioned obedience to orders tends to be
lower when the discipline required of a soldier is less strict.167 Thus, a
tendency for conditioned obedience is not likely to exist in the higher ranks
of the chain of command, where lax discipline is generally practiced.168
Research also indicates that if a second authoritative body makes a normative
proclamation that contradicts the wrongful order, subordinates will be less
likely to obey on impulse and instead will rationally consider the conflicting
messages.169 Supposedly, a lawmaker sends such a proclamation when the
law states soldiers should only obey legal orders, or that all grossly immoral,
illegal orders must be disobeyed.170 The problem, however, is that such
general messages are often ineffective because soldiers have a limited ability
to determine whether an order is illegal or grossly immoral.171 Yet, it is still
likely that more specific laws that delineate categories of orders that should
be disobeyed will reduce conditioned obedience.172 Thus, this excusatory
consideration does not lead to the conclusion that the normative approach
should always be adopted. However, this excusatory consideration should be

rationalization will lead subordinates to view orders given to them as being an exceptional
situation in which the moral norm does not apply. DANIEL MUÑOZ-ROJAS & JEAN-JACQUES
FRÉSARD, THE ROOTS OF BEHAVIOR IN WAR: UNDERSTANDING AND PREVENTING IHL
VIOLATIONS 15 (2004).
166
NICO KEIJZER, MILITARY OBEDIENCE 61–64 (1978); Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 121–27.
167
Gonzalez, supra note 92, at 111.
168
See Robert D. Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits
of the National Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J.
INT’L L. 39, 64, 73 (2007) (arguing that high-ranking state agents act in a calculating manner);
CASSESE, supra note 54, at 246 (listing situations in which orders are more likely to be
questioned).
169
KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 156, at 159 (“It is likely that divided authority reduces
the strength of binding forces even in situations in which one of the authorities is clearly of
higher status.”); see also Danielle S. Beu & M. Ronald Buckley, This is War: How the
Politically Astute Achieve Crimes of Obedience Through the Use of Moral Disengagement, 15
LEADERSHIP Q. 551, 565 (2004).
170
For a listing of normative limits on authority that can reduce conditioned obedience, see
KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 156, at 134–35.
171
See supra notes 137, 140 and accompanying text; see also OSIEL, supra note 10, at 119,
241 n.21 (“[I]t is likely that most illegal orders will be obeyed, given the overwhelming
influence of the military’s hierarchical structure . . . .”).
172
See KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 156, at 159.
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taken into account, mainly when addressing low-ranking subordinates in
emergency situations.
Thus, there are not any excusatory considerations that mandate the
adoption of either of the two conditional liability approaches in all instances.
When the different excusatory considerations are closely examined, we see
that each is only relevant in a limited set of circumstances.
B. Applying the Agency Analysis to the International Arena
Agency analysis uncovers the main harm of adopting the reduced
sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all policy. Such an approach may lead a
soldier to (mistakenly) disobey orders beneficial to the lawmaker (i.e., legal
orders). Yet, adopting a reduced sentence approach as a one-rule-fits-all
policy can still lead to maximal utility if the lawmaker never gains from the
performance of legal orders. Given the state grants the military the legal
authority to carry out acts for its benefit,173 it seems obvious that the
wholesale application of a reduced sentence approach will not have maximal
utility in practice. However, some implied that this conclusion only applies
to domestic law, and a reduced sentence approach can still have maximal
utility in the realm of international law.
States are the main lawmakers and enforcers of international law, which
implies domestic lawmakers are often the real architects of international
law.174 But, there is a difference between domestic lawmakers’ uses of
domestic law and their uses of international law. A state does not need to
rely on international law to dictate the behavior of its own agents; it can use
domestic law. Thus, by trying to convince other states a certain prohibition
is the international customary law or by agreeing with other states via treaty
that a certain act is prohibited, a domestic lawmaker attempts to influence the
behavior of foreign agents.175 Because the core aim of a military is to win
173

See Peter D. Feaver, The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz, and the
Question of Civilian Control, 23 ARMED FORCES & SOC’Y 149, 152–53 (1996) (“[The
military] is subordinate to the political authority of the state.”).
174
Eitan Diamond, Before the Abyss: Reshaping International Humanitarian Law to Suit the
Ends of Power, 43 ISR. L. REV. 414, 418 (2010) (“After all, it is States who make international
law, and it is they who can unmake it. When they, the authors of IHL, challenge the validity
and aptness of IHL rules, the implications are likely to be more far-reaching than when any
other actor does so.”); see also Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 53: Treaties Conflicting with A
Peremptory Norm of General International Law (“Jus Cogens”), in VIENNA CONVENTION ON
THE LAW OF TREATIES: A COMMENTARY 897, 918 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach eds.,
2012). One should not, however, ignore the difference in procedures between the two
systems, and that each domestic lawmaker has less power in the international arena than she
has domestically.
175
See Francesco Parisi, Rethinking Opinio Juris: A Law and Economics Perspective, 4
INT’L LEGAL THEORY 21, 21–22 (1998) (stating that “states articulate desirable norms as a way
to signal that they intend to follow and be bound by such rules” and implying that such a norm
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wars176 and the disciplined obedience to orders (certainly legal ones)
facilitates attainment of this aim, it is unlikely a state will be harmed when
enemy soldiers, in attempting to disobey internationally illegal orders, will
mistakenly disobey legal ones. As such, it has been argued that a superior
orders defense should never be recognized in international law, and instead a
reduced sentence rule should be adopted in all situations.177
However, this critique reflects an inaccurate conception of the role of
international law. By attempting to advance a certain norm in the
international arena, a state may actually wish to achieve two goals. First, a
state might wish to deter enemy soldiers from violating international
humanitarian law.178 Second, a state might wish to influence the manner in
which its own soldiers will be treated by the enemy.179 A reduced sentence
rule will not always be preferable in light of this second goal.
If the enemy, or a third state, reciprocates and applies a reduced sentence
rule when prosecuting the state’s soldiers, the state’s interest in protecting its
soldiers from foreign prosecution will be undermined. Moreover, even if the
state does not wish to protect its own soldiers who commit “war crimes of
obedience” from foreign prosecution, the state may still be harmed by
advancing a reduced sentence rule in the international arena. If other states
reciprocate and apply a reduced sentence rule when prosecuting the state’s
soldiers, and if that deters the state’s soldiers, the state is likely to be harmed
by the mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders that tend to occur under
a reduced sentence rule. When these harms outweigh the crime prevention
gains a state receives under a reduced sentence rule in the international arena,
a state will attempt to advance an approach that incorporates a superior
orders defense.
In other words, as in the domestic context, adopting either a reduced
sentence rule or a superior orders defense will only sometimes be preferable
to the other. Moreover, we can expect that, in many situations, an
intermediate solution should be adopted, and the kind of intermediate
solution that should be adopted will vary among different situations.

will be able to attain its desirable aim only if other states will adhere to it as well, so that it
will become the norm that governs the relevant actions of states at the international level).
176
United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955); Feaver, supra note 173, at 52.
177
Alexander N. Sack, War Criminals and the Defense of Superior Order in International
Law, 5 LAW. GUILD REV. 11, 14 n.25a (1945) (“The claim of application of . . . the defense of
superior order of the enemy . . . [is] quite absurd . . . . [T]he defense serves, primarily, as a
rule of discipline and morale, and there is nothing in the scriptures enjoining a belligerent to
help in maintaining discipline and morale of his enemy who wants to destroy him.”).
178
See Parisi, supra note 175, at 21–22.
179
A proclamation of a state concerning the international lex lata often is actually an attempt
to signal to other states the conduct rule it wishes all states to adopt. See id.
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C. Effects of Discretion in a Subordinate’s Determination of Legality
The lawmaker is more likely to keep the commander on the “right” path if
the law consists of clear and detailed rules. Such rules ensure commanders
will be less likely to mistakenly violate the law, and clear, detailed rules also
often make it easier for the lawmaker to recognize when the commander
violates the law.180
Compare the following two laws: (1) destruction of a religious site is
forbidden unless the enemy is conducting an attack from that site; and (2)
destruction of civilian property is not allowed unless some military necessity
exists that justifies its destruction. To determine whether the commander
violated the first law (i.e., a legal rule delegating a task to the commander),
only two factual issues need to be determined: (1) Was the attacked site a
religious site?; and (2) Did the enemy launch an attack from that site? On
the other hand, to determine whether the commander violated the second law
(i.e., a legal norm delegating discretion to the commander), the lawmaker
needs to know what constitutes “military necessity,” in addition to the
examination of the relevant factual questions. This can be hard to determine
for a person who is not a military expert.
Moreover, the lawmaker’s lack of expertise is also often the reason why
clear legal rules are not always used in the first place.181 An individual agent
is often better equipped than the lawmaker to determine what actions will
maximize the lawmaker’s utility.182 Accordingly, vast areas of the law are
legislated in a way that accords discretion to agents. This is most notably the
case with regards to administrative laws183 and laws that deal with
emergency situations.184 Furthermore, this is also the case with negligence
laws, which necessarily grant discretion to individual actors to determine
what is reasonable.185 Yet, due to differences in expertise, when the law is
discretionary the lawmaker is faced with a problem. The lawmaker lacks “an
effective means of reversing the agent’s decisions . . . . [T]he agent is chosen
because of expertise, so the principal must acquire expertise or hire another
expert to evaluate and then alter the agent’s choice.”186
180

See Cohen, supra note 87, at 31 (comparing negligence and strict liability norms).
See Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645,
685–89 (1991) (discussing the reasons that lead lawmakers to adopt discretionary norms and
not bright-line rules).
182
See Feaver, supra note 173, at 150–52 (analyzing the expertise related issues which lead
to the delegation of authority from the citizens as a collective to the lawmakers and from them
to the fighting force).
183
WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 5 (4th ed. 2000).
184
See a discussion of this issue in the text accompanying infra notes 191–93.
185
See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 281–82 (1986) (describing the law of negligence
in terms of delegation of decision-making authority from lawmakers to individuals).
186
McNollgast, The Political Economy of Law, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS
181
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When a lawmaker instructs a subordinate to disobey illegal orders, she
attempts to utilize the subordinate to evaluate and then alter the commander’s
choices. Interestingly, for reasons that will now be explained, the likelihood
a subordinate will correctly recognize whether an order is illegal is
influenced by whether a commander was given discretion in the first place.
If the commander was not given discretion and only concrete tasks have been
delegated to the commander, a subordinate’s duty is relatively limited in
scope. She is only expected to know the relevant rules set by the lawmaker
and act accordingly. But, if a commander is given discretion, in addition to
being required to know the relevant law, the subordinate needs to make an
independent assessment of her commander’s judgment to determine whether
an order is legal. For example, she needs to assess whether there is a
“military necessity” to destroy the civilian property to determine whether
that order is legal. In this situation, placing the subordinate under a duty to
review the superior’s orders gives the subordinate the concomitant discretion
to determine whether the act ordered should be performed.
Yet, this latter scenario presents a problem because a commander is likely
to possess better resources, knowledge, and skills.187 Therefore, placing the
subordinate under a duty to review the superior’s orders is likely to yield
results that do not serve the lawmaker’s goals because it delegates discretion
to a less qualified agent. Accordingly, a legal policy instructing the
subordinate to disobey illegal orders is often more likely to cause mistakes,
(i.e., disobedience of legal orders and obedience to illegal ones), when the
law that determines whether the order is legal is one that delegates discretion
to the commander. Moreover, as the difference in capability and skills
between subordinate and commander increases, so too does the likelihood
that instructing a subordinate to disobey illegal orders will result in mistakes.
An example of this can be seen in the recent Canadian case of R. v.
Liwyj.188 Liwyj, a vehicle technician, received an order to perform a brake
adjustment on a vehicle without caging bolts. He refused to do so under the
belief that it was unsafe, even though his more qualified commanders
determined it was safe. Liwyj was prosecuted for disobedience and argued
the order was illegal because the army’s “Safety Directive” instructed
soldiers to stop unsafe activities.189 The court wished to set a legal policy
that would defer to commanders’ determinations. The court did so by

1651, 1704 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007).
187
Lippman, supra note 20, at 248; Re’em Segev, Moral Justification, Administrative Power
and Emergencies, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 629, 654 (2005).
188
R. v. Liwyj, 2010 CarswellNat 4984 (Can. Ct. Martial App. Ct.) (WL).
189
Id. ¶¶ 2–9, 33.
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finding Liwyj guilty and adopting a normative approach (i.e., by instructing
soldiers to knowingly obey even some illegal orders).190
In requiring a subordinate to review the legality of her commanders’
orders, the greatest negative effect will occur when the law allows the
commander to infringe upon general legal rules in exceptional situations.
These legal exceptions almost always are allowed to be employed by agents
only in emergency situations.191 Furthermore, such legal norms are, usually,
based on a very strict lesser-evil rationale.192 That is, these laws instruct the
relevant agents to use such legal authority given to them as a last resort to be
used only in exceptional situations.193 Placing a subordinate under a duty to
review the legality of her commander’s orders in such situations requires the
subordinate to independently assess whether the generally prohibited conduct
should nevertheless be allowed under the circumstances. Because the law
instructs individuals to view the infringement of the general legal rule as an
act allowed only in exceptional (usually emergency) situations, a subordinate
may tend to err on the side of disobeying an “infringing” order. Thus,
because a superior will likely have more information and expertise, asking a
subordinate to review a superior’s orders in emergency situations may lead
soldiers to often mistakenly disobey legal orders.194
A 2008 Israeli case illustrated this problem.195 Israeli law forbids the
export of medicine without the Health Ministry’s approval. The Israeli
Defense Force (IDF) decided to send medical supplies to the Palestinian
authorities so that they would be able to treat civilians injured during combat
in Gaza. Due to the urgent need to deliver the medication, the IDF made the
delivery without first seeking the approval of the Health Ministry. At the
border, the IDF asked the head of the Israeli customs unit to allow the
convoy to pass. He agreed, yet one of his subordinates refused to allow the
trucks to pass because the Health Ministry had not given its approval, even
though he was explicitly ordered to do so by his superior.196 When tried for
disobedience, the subordinate claimed that the order was illegal and that
190

Id. ¶¶ 32–34.
Segev, supra note 187, at 629; see also FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 791–96 (discussing
generally the theory of lesser evils as the basis for criminal law defenses that deal with
emergency situations).
192
Segev, supra note 187, at 629; Robinson, supra note 22, at 203.
193
See MICHAEL INGATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 8
(2004) (discussing the lesser evil approach as applied to legal policy dealing with emergencies);
JOYCELYN M. POLLOCK, CRIMINAL LAW 86 (Elisabeth Roszmann Ebben & Michael C. Braswell
eds., 9th ed. 2009) (“The defense of necessity should be and has been very strictly applied.”).
194
Wasserstrom, supra note 137, at 202; OSIEL, supra note 10, at 64.
195
Civil Service Appeal 11196/07 Michaeli v. Commissioner of the Civil Service
(unpublished) (2008) (Isr.). It should be noted that Michaeli was not a soldier but a civil servant,
yet according to Israeli law the superior orders defense applies to civil servants as well.
196
Id. ¶¶ D–E, G(7).
191
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serious health risks could occur if medication was exported without the
Health Ministry’s prior approval.197 The Israeli Supreme Court ruled that the
order was legal because of the existence of “necessity,” stressing the fact that
the decision was made by much higher ranked and better qualified state
agents than the subordinate.198 The court wished to set a policy that would
lead the superiors’ determinations to be preferred, and thus ruled in support
of the normative approach.199
In sum, it is likely that a rule encouraging disobedience to unlawful
orders will cause more mistakes when the law at issue is discretionary, and
especially when that law is one that regulates emergency situations.
Moreover, the considerations a lawmaker faces when constructing a policy to
govern crimes of obedience differ depending on which law the orders are
expected to violate. If the law sets clear rules, the lawmaker needs to assess
the subordinate’s ability to learn these rules. If the law affords discretion to
the commander, the lawmaker needs to assess the subordinate’s expertise in
the issue regulated by the law. Current legal discourse has ignored the
existence of this difference, yet this difference further indicates different
crimes of obedience should be treated differently.
V. SOLUTION—A MODULAR POLICY
In light of the failure of current attempts to regulate crimes of obedience,
this Section offers an alternative. Instead of a one-rule-fits-all policy, a
modular one should be adopted. Legal solutions should be tailored to
accommodate the varied situations in which military orders are given.
A. Choosing a Fragmentation Level
According to agency analysis, the factors that should be considered when
determining how to regulate crimes of obedience depend heavily on the
situation in which the order was given. As such, it is inappropriate to
regulate the issue via a one-rule-fits-all policy. This subsection thus
examines the alternatives to the application of such a policy. It rules out the
option of letting the relevant decision makers regulate the issue on a case-bycase basis. It then advocates for a new approach, which would divide crimes
of obedience into narrower, discernible categories, each governed by a
different policy.

197
198
199

Id. ¶ D.
Id. ¶ G(7).
Id. ¶¶ G(1)–(7).
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1. Case-by-Case Regulation is Inappropriate
The lack of consensus about how to regulate crimes of obedience is not
merely the result of disagreement among supporters of different approaches.
Instead, as this Article uncovers, a more fundamental problem plagues the
current discourse on this subject. Contrary to current consensual premise,
there is, in fact, not one approach that is appropriate in all situations.
For practical purposes, one might therefore argue that it is appropriate to
allow the law to be as vague as it currently is because it enables courts,200 as
well as states with respect to international law,201 to regulate crimes of
obedience on a case-by-case basis. Furthermore, there is some evidence
indicating courts tend to rule in particular ways depending on the type of
situation presented.202 Similarly, other evidence suggests the shifting nature
of reciprocity is one reason for international law’s inconsistency with respect
to the law governing crimes of obedience.203 In other words, one may argue
there is not, truly, a problem of inconsistency in the current law, and current
legal vagueness actually enables treating different cases differently.
Yet, such a claim exaggerates the positive effects of current legal
vagueness (i.e., it is both descriptively and normatively flawed). As a
descriptive matter, case law of many legal systems clearly shows that the
case-by-case discretion made possible by current legal uncertainty leads to
substantial legal inconsistencies when evaluating crimes of obedience, and
causes similar cases to be treated differently.204
200
See, e.g., Nico Keijzer, A Plea for the Defence of Superior Orders, in 8 ISR. Y.B. HUM.
RTS. 78, 103 (1978) (“It must always be realized, however, that all doctrines and formulas are
not more than the means by which to determine whether a defendant is reasonably to blame
and they must, therefore, never be interpreted, so as to hinder attainment of just results.”).
201
Sato, supra note 9, at 125–26; 2 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 516–
19 (1968).
202
E.g., Albert Ehrenzweig, Soldiers’ Liability for Wrongs Committed on Duty Under
American and International Law, 30 CORNELL L. Q. 179, 179–80 (1944); Bohrer, supra note
37, at 262–67.
203
See Robert Cryer, The Boundaries of Liability in International Criminal Law, or
‘Selectivity by Stealth,’ 6 J. CONFLICT & SEC. L. 3, 11–16, 30–31 (2001) (comparing the norms
of the ad-hoc tribunals to those of the ICC); see also Sack, supra note 177, at 14 n.24
(discussing the reason behind the U.S.’s & U.K.’s pre-WWI position).
204
For a claim implying similar cases are treated alike, see Keijzer, supra note 200, at 103.
However, if similar cases are not treated alike, the results cannot be considered just. See, e.g.,
Bohrer, supra note 37, at 228–29 (discussing similar crimes of obedience that were not treated
alike under Israeli case law because each courts-martial applied a different approach). The
clearest example of such inconsistency in international law can be seen by comparing the
rulings of the two main trials that dealt with the perpetrators of the Ardeatine Cave Massacre;
a massacre committed under Hitler’s orders as reprisals for the killing of S.S. soldiers by
Italian partisans. Compare In re Kappler, 15 Ann. Dig. 471 (Italy, Military Tribunal of Rome
1948), cited in CASSESE, supra note 54, at 236–37 (acquitting the subordinate soldiers based
on a reapondeat superior approach masked as a ruling on mens rea), with Priebke’s case,
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As a normative matter as well, as explained hereinafter, courts should not
be afforded such discretion by domestic or international law when dealing
with obedience to illegal orders. Nor should international law allow such
discretion to states.
Assessing the considerations relevant to the issue of obedience to illegal
order is not an exact science. Judges necessarily vary in their assessments,
and thus similar cases are often not treated similarly, which creates a fairness
problem.205 This variation reduces the likelihood of developing clear rules
ex ante. As such, a fair-notice problem is created as well.206 Moreover, since
such a policy fails to create clear instructions for soldiers, it leads to
inefficiencies. Agency analysis shows that a lawmaker should take into
consideration the probability a subordinate will correctly obey or disobey
orders as instructed.207 Choosing a legal policy that sends a convoluted
message is therefore counterproductive, given that it increases the probability
subordinates will obey when the lawmaker would wish them to disobey and
vice versa.
Similarly, it is unjust to allow states to determine the international law
regarding crimes of obedience according to the level of reciprocity between
the states involved in a specific conflict. A person’s culpability for war
crimes should be determined by her actions, not based on the identity of her
state or the identity of the tribunal in which she is prosecuted.208
Moreover, increased support for complementarity mechanisms and the
use of universal jurisdiction indicate that allowing states such discretion is
inefficient. States can choose not to adopt a general prohibition, which
would force regulation to be necessarily restricted to a specific conflict and
dependent on the aims and capabilities of the specific states involved in that
conflict.209 The adoption of a general prohibition (i.e., declaring a certain act
prohibited by international criminal law) is achieved, however, when states
attempt to maximize their utility in the long run.210 During multilateral
discussed in Francesca Martines, The Defences of Reprisals, Superior Orders and Duress in
the Priebke Case Before the Italian Military Tribunal, 1 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 354,
356–57 (1998) (convicting the subordinate soldier based on a conditional liability approach).
205
See sources cited supra note 204; see also supra notes 51–52.
206
Emily Sherwin, Rule-Oriented Realism, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1578, 1592–93 (2005)
(reviewing HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004)); see also
Robinson, supra note 51 and accompanying text.
207
See supra Part III.D.
208
See RATNER & ABRAMS, supra note 35, at 25 (explaining criminality “should be
measured . . . by an objective standard”); Drumbl, supra note 68, at 556–59.
209
See James D. Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in
International Politics, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S41, S54 (2002) (describing the pros and cons of
bilateral, pre-war treaty making).
210
Id. at S54–55; see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG
NATIONS 57 (1990).
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negotiations, most states involved are usually those that have not recently
been, are not currently, and do not anticipate being involved in armed
conflict.211 Because these states are not engaged in an armed conflict, they
are less likely to inject case-specific, self-serving concerns into the drafting
process.212 Instead, the process becomes more focused on whether the longterm harm states can expect to suffer without an international prohibition on
certain conduct is greater than the long-term gains states can expect from
having their agents perform that conduct. Thus, this decisionmaking process
has the potential to be as close as practically possible to one made under a
veil of ignorance.213
However, if the rules of enforcement are allowed to vary between
conflicts, states’ attempt to maximize their utility in the long run will fail.
“[T]rying individual violators from other states during wartime is likely to
lead to reciprocal spirals between states rather than deterrence of individual
violations” since “[s]tates at war cannot demonstrate to one another that such
trials are fair.”214 When a reciprocal spiral occurs, each state retaliates by
further punishing soldiers of the other side, as well as by violating other
international norms in reprisal.215 Such retaliation may lead to a vicious
circle and an abandonment of international legal norms that both states wish
to maintain.216 Moreover, the concern about a reciprocal spiral often leads to
an opposite result, such that states avoid prosecuting enemy soldiers who
commit war crimes in fear of reprisal by foreign states.217 Thus, relying on
the interests of individual states in each conflict to enforce the prohibitions of
international criminal law will often lead to failure.
Some of these problems can be resolved by employing universal
jurisdiction. Universal jurisdiction minimizes the concern that prohibitions
of international criminal law will not be enforced, since the abdication of any
one state of its authority to prosecute will not prevent other parties from
initiating prosecution.218 However, a state might still view the prosecution of
its soldiers by a foreign state as unfair, and thus a reciprocal spiral might still
occur.219 This concern is resolved by allowing prosecution by foreign states
211

Morrow, supra note 209, at S54–55.
Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at S57.
215
See id. at S56–57 (giving the treatment of POWs during WWII as an example).
216
Id. at S48–52.
217
E.g., id. at S57.
218
See, e.g., Rikhof, supra note 111, at 51 (discussing global increase in prosecutions of war
crimes by different states and international tribunals, including on the basis of universal
jurisdiction, which resulted in war criminals, currently, having “fewer places to hide”).
219
See, e.g., MITSUE INAZUMI, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL JURISDICTION FOR PROSECUTING SERIOUS CRIMES UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW 62 (2005) (stating that the proposed universal jurisdiction provision to
212
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to be used only as a complementary enforcement mechanism,220 such that
each state holds the primary responsibility for prosecuting its own soldiers
and foreign states are allowed to step in only when the state fails to enforce
international criminal law and prosecute its own soldiers.221 Under such a
legal regime, states’ ability to abuse their authority to prosecute enemy
soldiers is reduced. At the same time, each state still has a strong incentive
to prevent and punish international crimes committed by its own soldiers.
Therefore, the likelihood a state would conclude a belligerent is shirking its
international obligations decreases, thereby reducing the likelihood a
reciprocal spiral will ensue.222
However, this enforcement mechanism cannot work if the norms that
determine the responsibility of individuals, such as the norms that determine
the responsibility of subordinates for crimes of obedience, are determined by
each state based on its interests in each specific conflict. If such norms are
not set ex ante, states will never be able to demonstrate to one another that
their prosecution of foreign soldiers is fair or that their decision not to punish
their own soldiers is done in good faith.223 Further, the necessary fairness
cannot be demonstrated, even if international standards for individual
criminal responsibility have been adopted ex ante, if states are allowed to
diverge from them and apply harsher standards in cases in which they are
prosecuting foreign soldiers for international crimes.
Similarly, the
necessary good faith cannot be demonstrated, if states are allowed to apply
laxer standards than the international ones in cases where they are
prosecuting their own soldiers for international crimes. Without such general
applicability of international standards that are set ex ante reciprocal spirals
the UN Genocide Convention was opposed due to a “deep-rooted mistrust [by each state] of
the judicial systems and proceedings within other States” which led to a concern that adopting
a universal jurisdiction for genocide will increase “international conflicts among States,
entailing new threats to peace”).
220
Universal Criminal Jurisdiction with regard to the Crime of Genocide, Crimes Against
Humanity and War Crimes, art. 3(c)–(d) (Institute of International Law Seventeenth
Commission, 2005).
221
Markus Benzing, The Complementarity Regime of the International Criminal Court:
International Criminal Justice Between State Sovereignty and the Fight Against Impunity, 7
MAX PLANCK Y.B. U.N. L. 591, 596 (2003).
222
Morrow, supra note 209, at S56–57.
223
Cf. id. at S59–60 (discussing the need for clear rules); see also Pierre-Hugues Verdier,
Cooperative States: International Relations, State Responsibility and the Problem of Custom,
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 842, 850–51, 856 (2002) (distinguishing between “primary rules,”
which determine the substantive manner in which an issue would be regulated, and
“secondary rules,” which determine what acts would be considered as violations of the
primary norm; and arguing that states have a greater incentive to set ex ante general secondary
rules because irrespective of their substantive interest in each case, states have a joint interest
to clarify which acts should be considered as violations in order to facilitate reliable
communication and prevent mistaken acts of retaliation).

50

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:1

will not be prevented. An international law dealing with crimes of obedience
should, therefore, be one that attempts to maximize a state’s utility in the
long run, and accordingly it should be based on a decision-making process
that resembles one made behind a veil of ignorance.
Behind this veil of ignorance, several issues should be viewed as
preconditions (i.e., as issues already agreed upon by the states). Mainly, it
should be assumed that states have accepted the substantive criminal act is
harmful in the long run, and further agreed not to apply, with respect to war
crimes of obedience, a laxer standard of individual responsibility on their
own soldiers, or a harsher stranded on foreign soldiers, than the one they
adopt as the international standard on the matter. Also, as it is a decision
made behind a veil of ignorance, we need to assume that states do not know
whether they will be the ones prosecuting foreign soldiers or whether their
own soldiers will be prosecuted by others. Thus, differences in states’ ability
to retaliate can be negated.224 Therefore, in international law as in domestic
law, the determination of the proper legal policy to deal with crimes of
obedience should be made by weighing the crime prevention benefits of
holding subordinate soldiers accountable against the harm caused by
mistaken acts of disobedience to legal orders if subordinates are held
accountable.
In sum, although a single rule should not be applied to all cases, we
should also not allow courts or states unfettered discretion to regulate crimes
of obedience on a case-by-case basis. Justice and efficiency demand that
courts, states, and soldiers be guided by clear legal rules set ex ante.225
2. Choosing the Proper Level of Specification
While laws are necessarily general in nature, there is a limit on the level
of generalization that is appropriate.226 The more general a law is, the more
inefficient it will be due to over-inclusiveness. Instead of each issue being
regulated by a legal norm tailored to efficiently deal with that issue, different
issues are all regulated in a single manner by one legal norm. This leads to
an excessive number of cases where the optimal result is not reached.227
224
See David Rodin, The Liability of Ordinary Soldiers for Crimes of Aggression, 6 WASH.
U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 591, 600–01 (2007); RAWLS, supra note 155, at 378 (discussing what
should be assumed in the “original position”).
225
See Schauer, supra note 181, at 658–61 (discussing the ability of clear rules, if adopted
ex ante, to prevent inconsistency among implementing organs).
226
See generally Frederick Schauer, The Generality of Law, 107 W. VA. L. REV. 217 (2004);
LARRY ALEXANDER & EMILY SHERWIN, THE RULE OF RULES 18–20, 31–32 (2001).
227
See Herman Oliphant, A Return to Stare Decisis, 14 A.B.A. J. 71, 74 (1928) (describing
how due to a “process of widening generalizations” legal categories “were expanded to
include diverse states of fact with the result that the very devices designed to bring and keep
the courts close to the issues of life before them operated to remove them to positions more
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Moreover, an overly generalized law forces framers to use abstract terms
(such as the term “manifestly unlawful orders”), which leads to legal
uncertainty.228
But in an overly fragmented legal scheme, the likelihood for legal
uncertainty also increases. In such a law, this is due to an increased
likelihood that an overlap will exist between definitions of different
categories.229 Additionally, the more detailed a law is, the more costly it is to
draft and teach to the relevant agents.230 Thus, at a certain point,
specification will lead to suboptimal results, legal uncertainty, or both.
How should the level of specification be determined? A lawmaker could
examine each individual case in an attempt to find similarities between cases
and then divide the issue into categories based on those perceived
similarities.231 But this method would be too costly, if not impossible, to
implement, and it would often prove difficult to objectively determine what
constitutes a similarity.232 A better way of subdividing while maintaining
clear distinctions between legal categories would be to have the categories
track the way the social issues the lawmaker wishes to regulate are divided
and subdivided in practice.233 Doing so would make the boundaries between
categories more straightforward and less disputed because the new legal
categories would reflect common cultural understandings.234 As such, the
and more remote from the life which they regulated, with the result that they regulated it with
an ever-decreasing feeling for its realities”); Hanoch Dagan, Codification, Coherence and
Proprietary Competitions 5 (Tel-Aviv Uni. Law Sch. Law Faculty Paper No. 34, 2006)
(stating, in the context of private law, that the use of over-inclusive generalizations is
inappropriate, because “narrow categories . . . represent a tentative suggestion for slicing the
social universe into economically and socially differentiated segments, recognizing that each
‘transaction of life’ has some features that are of sufficient normative importance to justify
distinct legal treatment”).
228
See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960: THE
CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 18–19 (1992) (describing, in the context of American law, how
an aspiration for unification and generalization has led to a tendency to use overly abstract
terms resulting in legal uncertainty).
229
See Peter Birks, Equity in the Modern Law: An Exercise in Taxonomy, 26 U.W. AUSTL.
L. REV. 1, 16 (1996) (“One advantage of a good classification is that it . . . militates against
the tricks that complex language can play in concealing similarities and unnecessarily
proliferating entities.”).
230
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 226, at 31–32; see also WILLIAM SHAW,
CONTEMPORARY ETHICS: TAKING ACCOUNT OF UTILITARIANISM 164 (1999) (arguing rules need
to be simple enough to be learned yet specific enough to maximize utility).
231
See 2 JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE LAW
116–17 (R. Campbell ed., 1875).
232
See STEPHEN WADDAMS, DIMENSIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: CATEGORIES AND CONCEPTS IN
ANGLO-AMERICAN LEGAL REASONING 229 (2003) (describing the difficulty of accurately
categorizing legal issues).
233
Dagan, supra note 227, at 5–6; Karl N. Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence: The Next
Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 439 (1930).
234
Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and
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existence of a common understanding is likely to reduce legal uncertainty.
Moreover, such an approach has proved to be the “most effective and secure
way of handling legal problems”235 by shaping legal rules in a way that is
“close and contemporary” to the human problems they deal with.236
Because cultural understanding varies amongst legal societies, this Article
will only be able to offer a general model legal policy based on common
features present in modern militaries.237 However, these common features
could serve as the basis for the advised level of specification when
addressing crimes of obedience in international law, because the shared
cultural background is limited in the international arena and the laws of war
are often phrased based on a common denominator all states can agree
upon.238 As to domestic law, before adopting the suggested policy in any
specific legal system, the model policy should first be adapted to
accommodate the cultural background of that specific society. However, the
common experience of modern militaries does expose several important
divisions regarding military discipline.
It was once believed military discipline would be harmed unless a rule
favoring unquestioning obedience at all times was adopted.239 However,
support for the respondeat superior approach has been abandoned, and
military discipline has since become much less rigid.240 Despite such
changes, it is still often argued that because “discipline is embedded in all
areas of military life and activity,” there is “no ability to sort it or to divide it

Constitutionalism, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 752 (1998); see also A.P. SIMESTER & G.R.
SULLIVAN, CRIMINAL LAW: THEORY AND DOCTRINE 600 (3d ed. 2007) (arguing legal meaning is
better conveyed when publically shared moral distinctions exist and are reflected in the law).
235
Oliphant, supra note 227, at 74.
236
Hanoch Dagan, Restitution’s Realism 11 (Tel-Aviv Uni. Law Sch. Law Faculty Paper
No. 67, 2007) (citing Oliphant, supra note 227, at 73–74).
237
Such common experience does exist, both in the context of military culture, see SAMUEL
P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE 13 (1957) (discussing the universal skills of
soldiers), and in military law. See CLIFTON D. BRYANT, KHAKI-COLLAR CRIME 31 (1979)
(discussing the near universality of military justice norms).
238
Robin Geiss, Humanitarian Law Obligations of Organized Armed Groups, in NONSTATE ACTORS AND INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 93, 96–97 (Maurizio Moreno ed.,
2010) (denoting IHL as the lowest common denominator that all sides agree upon).
239
E.g., KEIJZER, supra note 166, at 75 (discussing the position of the French Senate in
1882).
240
LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 305–06 (2d ed. 2000).
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according to issues,”241 and thus a one-rule-fits-all policy should be
adopted.242
But this claim is inaccurate and misleading. Modern military forces have
in fact recognized two major distinctions in the levels of discipline that
should be applied. There are differences between: (1) higher and lower
ranking soldiers;243 and (2) routine and emergency situations.244 Therefore, a
legal policy that recognizes these distinctions is likely to increase efficiency
while decreasing legal uncertainty. Thus, these distinctions should guide the
way crimes of obedience are addressed.
B. Criminal Orders in Non-Emergency Situations
Criminal conduct is strongly regulated by rules and not discretionary legal
norms, due in part to the strong fair-notice considerations the subject
raises.245 There are only a few exceptions to the rule-based regulation of the
field, namely norms of criminal law governing emergency situations246 and
negligence offenses.247 Outside of these exceptions, not much discretion is
delegated to the individual. As such, a legal policy which instructs
subordinates to disobey an order that violates a penal prohibition does not
require the subordinates to exercise much discretion when the order does not
concern a negligence offense and is not given in an emergency situation.248
Moreover, in non-emergency situations, subordinates and commanders will
often have the same general access to relevant legal and factual
information.249 And, even if the commander initially has more information,
241

General Order of the High Command, 6.0302 Discipline — Commander Responsibility
and the Responsibilities of the Staff, art. 2 (Isr.) (translated from Hebrew by the author); see
also United States v. Lusk, 21 M.J. 695, 700 (A.C.M.R. 1985) (“In combat, . . . obedience to
orders is vital. . . . In peacetime, soldiers must be trained in the same climate of obedience.
The discipline which enables armies to prevail cannot be switched on and off like a
lightbulb.”).
242
See, e.g., Addicott, supra note 17, at 87–88; Sandra L. Visser, The Soldier and
Autonomy, in 1 MILITARY MEDICAL ETHICS 251, 262 (Thomas E. Beam & Linette R.
Sparacino eds., 2003).
243
See infra Part V.D.
244
MORRIS JANOWITZ, THE PROFESSIONAL SOLDIER, at xix, 4–5 (2d ed. 1971).
245
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 21 (2d ed. 1994); SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note
234, at 28.
246
See, e.g., FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 570–73 (discussing the need to use vague terms in
many justification defenses due to the fact that they deal with exceptional emergency
situations); Paul H. Robinson, Rules of Conduct and Principles of Adjudication, 57 U. CHI. L.
REV. 729, 769 (1990) (“Indeed, reduced standards of precision may be necessary for
justifications. The situationally-dependent nature of these doctrines means that, to remain
communicable rules of conduct, justifications cannot be stated with great specificity.”).
247
SIMESTER & SULLIVAN, supra note 234, at 26 n.26, 28–29.
248
See supra Part III.C.
249
The difference between expected knowledge in emergency and non-emergency situations
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often there will not be a heightened need to either maintain secrecy250 or
respond immediately.251 Thus, the legal and factual basis for the order can
be explained to the subordinate. Therefore, in this context, adopting a legal
rule that instructs subordinates to disobey illegal orders is not likely to cause
a significant increase in the number of mistaken acts of disobedience to legal
orders or obedience to illegal ones. In non-emergency situations, lawmakers
should thus adopt a rule demanding subordinates of all ranks to disobey
orders that violate penal prohibitions, when such prohibitions are not
negligence offenses.
As such, either the factual conditional liability approach or the reduced
sentence approach should be adopted here. The difference between these
two policies, as previously discussed, lies in the level of doubt regarding an
order’s legality that will lead a soldier to disobey an order.252 Because we
can assume an information gap will still exist between low-ranking
subordinates and commanders, adopting a factual approach will be more
efficient with regard to low-ranking subordinates. Such an approach would
provide a limited incentive to these subordinates to err on the side of
obedience. Moreover, because of asymmetric access to information, we can
expect low-ranking subordinates to rely on their commanders’ legal
determinations. Thus, excusatory considerations also support the adoption of
a reasonable mistake defense for obedience to illegal orders. Of course, it is
certainly possible there are subcategories of non-emergency situations in
which the factual approach would not maximize the lawmaker’s utility.
However, an overly detailed legal policy is likely to cause a myriad of
harms.253 Therefore, the factual approach should still be used in a majority
of non-emergency situations.
As for high-ranking subordinates, the information gap is expected to be
much narrower.254 Thus, a strong argument can be made for a reduced
sentence approach. However, the decision to employ a reduced sentence
is implied in e.g., LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK 212 (Brian J. Bill ed., 2000) (giving
the following rationales for the superior orders defense: (1) “Virtually all military activities
would be criminal if committed in peacetime”; (2) “Combat involves a significant deviation
from moral norms.”).
250
While secrecy always plays a role in the military, it can be expected to play a larger role
during war. STEPHEN VAN EVERA, CAUSES OF WAR: POWER AND THE ROOTS OF CONFLICT 145
(1999).
251
See LAW OF WAR WORKSHOP DESKBOOK, supra note 249, at 212 (“Subordinates cannot
be expected scrupulously to weigh the legal merits of orders received in combat.”); see also
ARMED FORCES OFFICER, supra note 81, at 10 (emphasizing time constraints).
252
See supra Part III.D.2 (comparing a soldier’s consequences for mistaken disobedience to
legal orders under the reduced sentence approach to those under the factual approach).
253
See supra Part V.A.2 (discussing the harm of an overly fragmented legal policy).
254
See infra Part V.D (discussing the unique consequences that arise when both
commanders and subordinates are high-ranking officials).
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approach over a factual approach should be left to the lawmakers of each
specific legal system after considering the actual information gap between
high-ranking subordinates and their commanders in that specific legal
system.
Let us examine a main advantage of adopting a factual approach or a
reduced sentence approach over adopting a normative approach. A
normative conditional liability approach encourages an almost reflexive sort
of obedience.255 On the other hand, both a factual approach and a reduced
sentence approach give a subordinate more freedom to express her concerns
that the order is illegal. During non-emergency situations, the delay caused
by allowing the subordinate to express such concerns is not likely to lead to
severe harm. Moreover, it can prevent crimes as well as decrease mistaken
acts of disobedience to legal orders. A subordinate is likely to obey if, after a
short dialogue, the legal basis of the order is explained to her. Similarly, a
commander who gives a criminal order by mistake can correct herself if a
careful subordinate takes the time to point it out. Even a commander who
intentionally gives an illegal order is often likely to amend it once the
illegality of the order is exposed. Thus, in most non-emergency situations, a
normative approach will not best serve the lawmaker’s utility.
C. Other Illegal Orders
Orders can also be illegal because they violate either administrative legal
norms or negligence offenses.256 Obligating subordinates to disobey illegal
orders that violate such laws raises unique concerns. First, since these laws
are often discretionary in nature, a legal policy that instructs subordinates to
disobey an order that violates such laws will delegate extensive discretion to
the subordinate, which will in turn increase the likelihood mistakes will
occur.257 Second, since the punishment for violating such laws is usually not
severe, the lawmaker’s ability to deter subordinates from obeying such
illegal orders is limited. Third, subordinates are even less likely to be
cognizant of the relevant law in this context.258 Fourth, we can often expect
less harm to be caused by the violation of such laws.259 Yet, there is a strong
255
See sources cited supra note 37 (noting the rare circumstances in which a soldier is duty
bound to disobey orders under a normative approach).
256
For that distinction to be clear, orders that violate penal prohibitions such as Article 92(1)
(failure “to obey any lawful general order or regulation”) and Article 92(3) (dereliction of
duties) of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 892(1), (3) (2006), should be
viewed as orders that violate administrative norms and not penal norms.
257
See supra Part III.C.
258
See GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 456 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing
that even in the common law a mistake regarding a law, other than criminal law, can be a
defense).
259
ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 67–68 (3d ed. 1999).
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reason for instructing subordinates to disobey such orders. Due to the
harshness of criminal law sanctions and the cost of their enforcement, the
lawmaker often resorts to administrative law to direct her agents’ actions.260
Therefore, encouraging subordinates to obey such illegal orders can lead to
massive violations of administrative law, which can considerably diminish
the lawmaker’s ability to control her military agents.
These different concerns can properly be taken into account if the law
distinguishes between low-ranking and high-ranking soldiers.261 In the
military, as in any hierarchical body, general policies are determined by
high-ranking officials. Thus, obligating high-ranking soldiers to disobey
orders that violate administrative and negligence legal norms will allow the
lawmaker to retain sufficient control over the policies of the military.262
Secondly, because high-ranking soldiers are military professionals, they can
be expected to familiarize themselves with the reasonable practices and
administrative procedures that govern their profession. Third, administrative
and disciplinary sanctions have greater deterrent effect when carried out
against a professional career officer than when carried out against a lowranking soldier who views military service as a short and temporary
experience.263 Therefore, high-ranking soldiers should be instructed to only
obey such legal orders (i.e., to disobey such illegal orders), whereas lowranking subordinates should be instructed to obey all such orders.
D. Orders Given in Emergency Situations
In emergency situations, disobeying a legal order can endanger lives and
thwart legitimate operations.264 Also, there are certain concerns that are
uniquely strong in emergency situations, such as the need to respond
immediately and maintain secrecy, which constrain a commander’s ability to
explain an order’s legal basis to a subordinate.265 Furthermore, instructing
260

McCubbins et al., supra note 89, at 250–53.
The current section discusses the issue of obedience to orders that violate administrative
law only in non-emergency situations for two reasons. First, this issue is less relevant in
emergency situations because most administrative restrictions are lifted in times of
emergency. See JANOWITZ, supra note 244, at 4–5; see also sources cited infra note 267
(noting the military’s authoritative structure becomes more flexible in wartime). Secondly, as
will be explained in the next section, in times of emergency: (1) high-ranking subordinates
should be under a duty to disobey all orders they think are unlawful; and (2) low-ranking
subordinates should be under a duty to obey even some orders that violate penal norms.
262
It should be noted that, based on this rationale, some countries have already adopted a
reduced sentence policy for high-ranking subordinates. Osiel, supra note 20, at 1121 n.759.
263
William C. Cockerham & Lawrence E. Cohen, Obedience to Orders: Issues of Morality
and Legality in Combat Among U.S. Army Paratroopers, 58 SOC. FORCES 1272, 1285 (1980).
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Ofer Military Appeal, supra note 36, ¶ 65.
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low-ranking subordinates to disobey orders will often be ineffective, since
low-ranking subordinates are more likely to develop a strong psychological
tendency to obey orders in emergency situations, regardless of an order’s
legality.266
Moreover, even if low-ranking subordinates do not develop a conditioned
tendency to “automatically” obey orders, their attempt to rationally assess
whether an order is illegal will be very likely to result in a mistaken
conclusion. That is because emergencies are regulated by discretionary legal
norms, and most legal rules may be infringed upon in emergency
situations.267 This is not to say that individuals are given unlimited
discretion in emergencies, but flexibility is necessary when dealing with
emergency situations. Since emergencies are difficult to plan for, often the
most the law can do to govern such situations is to adopt limits that guide
and structure an agent’s discretion, as opposed to bright-line conduct rules.268
That is, the law does not tell the relevant agent how exactly to act, instead it
tells the agent which consideration she should, and should not, take into
account, and it also gives the agent some instructions on how to assess and
balance the relevant considerations.
For example, some of these norms limit the discretion of the agent mainly
by demanding there must be necessity to perform the infringing act,269
allowing the infringing act only if it causes harm that is proportional to the
benefits that will be attained by it,270 or only allowing the use of reasonable
force when committing the infringing act.271

266

See supra Part II.A.2.
E.g., Segev, supra note 187, at 639–43; Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses
to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1027–31 (2003) (describing
how government power expands in emergency situations).
268
See, e.g., Segev, supra note 187, at 638–39, 654–55 (arguing for wide executive latitude
to act on lesser evil grounds rather than strict adherence to rules at times of emergency); see
also JANOWITZ, supra note 244, at xix, 4–5 (noting the military’s authoritative structure
becomes more flexible in wartime and most restrictions placed on soldiers during times of
peace through detailed general orders are lifted); Gross, supra note 267, at 1027–31
(discussing the value of a more flexible military authoritative system during times emergency
that leads to a shift in the kind of norms used to regulate the military).
269
What constitutes necessity differs among different emergency norms, yet in all of these
norms, the agent is left with substantial discretion to decide whether necessity exists. See,
e.g., 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, at 25–32 (describing the military
necessity test that determines which objects are legitimate targets according to IHL);
POLLOCK, supra note 193, at 86–88 (explaining the necessity defense in criminal law).
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See, e.g., 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, at 46–48 (discussing the IHL
proportionality norm that allows incidental harm to civilian objectives, if that harm cannot be
avoided in attaining a military advantage and it is not disproportionate to the military
advantage).
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E.g., POLLOCK, supra note 193, at 90–93 (discussing the reasonable force limit of selfdefense in criminal law).
267

58

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:1

Agency analysis indicates that when the legality of an order depends on
the violation of a discretionary emergency law, it is much more likely that
subordinates will mistakenly disobey legal orders if they are instructed to
disobey illegal ones.272 Thus, it seems that an obedience rule that
incorporates a strong superior orders defense is the most optimal legal
policy. Yet, as explained hereinafter, we can make an even finer distinction
based on the current disciplinary policy of modern militaries.
An order is, essentially, an act which delegates a task to a subordinate.
When we think of an order, we think of a narrow directive that is not
preceded by any explanation—a subordinate is told exactly what to do, such
that she has very little discretion as to how to carry out the order (hereinafter
strict orders).273 This brusqueness can often increase efficiency and reduce
mistakes because it leaves all authority in the hands of a single agent. This
means of communication will thus often be the most appropriate in
emergencies, and as such, lawmakers delegate to military commanders the
authority to give such orders to their subordinates.274
However, reliance on strict orders is not always the best course of action.
Emergency situations present an environment in which conditions can
rapidly change. Subordinates on the field are often the first to observe these
changes as they develop. Attempts by the subordinate to transmit
information to her superior in real-time often fail,275 and reliance on strict
orders leaves the subordinate with little room to respond to new
developments.276 Furthermore, the assumption that the commander, as an
expert, is the optimal decision maker is based on the notion that experts are
better equipped to properly assess macro-level considerations (such as long
term effects and considerations that arise from the larger context in which the
specific act is performed).277 Yet, experience has revealed that in many
emergency situations this ability to take into account the big picture does not
lead commanders to reach better decisions. Instead, an attempt to factor in
these macro-level considerations can overwhelm even an expert decision
272

See supra Part IV.C.
Wallerstein, supra note 45, at 114 (“[A]n order connotes that the subordinate has a
reason to refrain from acting on any other reason for which he might have for doing, or
abstaining from doing, X.”).
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Osiel, supra note 20, at 967–68; White, supra note 21, at 60.
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Units a Myth or Reality?, 6 (Dec. 21, 1992) (unpublished monograph School of Advanced
Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College), available at http://
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monograph School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General
Staff College), available at http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/utils/getfile/collection/p4013coll3/id/212
5/filename/2126.pdf.
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maker.278 Therefore, allowing subordinates to examine each concrete act
separately, even though they tend to negate macro-level considerations, has
often proven to be more effective.279
Due to these problems posed by strict orders, modern militaries have
adopted mission orders as an alternative means of communication.280
According to the mission orders doctrine, a commander must first assess the
big picture and then issue a “mission order” to the subordinate based on that
assessment. The mission order (unlike a strict order) must include the
following: an explanation of the reasons behind the order, a definition of
mission objections, and a set of limitations the commander wishes to place
on the ways a subordinate could achieve those objectives.281 Beyond setting
limitations, this doctrine allows the subordinate to exercise discretion in
determining how to accomplish the mission.282 Moreover, it encourages the
subordinate to adapt the mission orders and even act contrary to orders if the
orders do “not appear consistent with the developing situation.”283
Yet, the mission orders doctrine has downsides. As discretion is
delegated further down the chain of command to less experienced soldiers,
more mistakes will be made. The cost-benefit analysis has thus led modern
militaries to adopt mission orders,284 but, only when certain characteristics
are present in the commander-subordinate relationship; namely: (1) the
difference between each individual’s level of expertise and access to
information must not be too extensive; and (2) both subordinate and
commander must share a common professional perspective,285 which
promotes trust and reduces the likelihood the subordinate and superior will
interpret orders differently, or otherwise make contradictory decisions.286
278

Jordan, supra note 275, at 6.
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Because both of these characteristics are generally present only when both
commander and subordinate are high-ranking officers,287 the mission orders
doctrine is not, and should not be, the main means of communication
amongst the lower ranks. It should be noted that not all orders given to highranking subordinates are mission orders. Yet, even when a high-ranking
subordinate officer initially receives a strict order, it is very likely that the
commander will respect the subordinate’s attempts to clarify the order,
thereby facilitating more dialogue.
Thus, in light of the capabilities of high-ranking subordinates and the
discretion commonly afforded to them after receiving an order, high-ranking
subordinates can and should be instructed to disobey illegal orders in
emergency situations. Even though such a disobedience-rule delegates
discretion to subordinates, it is likely to cause only a moderate number of
errors. Importantly, modern armed forces seem to have accepted this
moderate risk, as demonstrated by their use of the mission orders doctrine.288
As such, with respect to high-ranking subordinates, it would be
appropriate either to adopt a reduced sentence approach or to afford them a
superior orders defense of the kind advanced by the factual approach.
Lawmakers should choose between the two based upon the extent to which
their high-ranking subordinates can be demanded and expected to always
know the law and recognize illegal orders, even in emergency situations.289
At a minimum, a reduced sentence approach should be adopted for members
of the “General Staff,” because the discretion afforded to these very highranking subordinates is uniquely extensive290 and the difference in
knowledge and expertise between such subordinates and their superiors is
uniquely small.291
A reduced sentence approach or a factual approach should not be applied,
however, to low-ranking soldiers, as their lack of expertise and information

287
Johnson, supra note 281 passim; Cowan, supra note 276 passim. Of course, cultural
variation exists in the adoption of this doctrine. See Paul Johnston, Doctrine Is Not Enough:
The Effects of Doctrine in the Behavior of Armies, PARAMETERS, Autumn 2000, at 30
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different armed forces). Accordingly, in some armed forces, mission orders are often used
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See Kaplan, supra note 152.
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HUNTINGTON, supra note 237, at 77–78 (noting the military commander has greater ability to
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will often lead them to mistakenly disobey legal orders.292 Moreover, even a
normative approach will not help prevent this problem because “[a]n act that
seems to the uninformed as manifestly wrong may actually be morally
justified.”293
Adopting a conditional liability approach can also lead to the opposite
problem of encouraging massive obedience to illegal orders. Due to the
psychological conditions that exist during emergencies, low-ranking
subordinates often do not critically examine the legality or morality of an
order. This is true even if they are instructed by law to do so, and even if
they would, in retrospect, acknowledge the ordered acts were severely
immoral and clearly illegal. Therefore, they often tend to “automatically”
obey illegal and immoral orders in times of emergency.294
Thus, the proper course of action is to further fragment the issue by
formulating a list of more specific disobedience-rules. Similar to the way a
normative approach attempts to serve the lawmaker’s utility,295 each rule
should be adopted if the illegal act it attempts to prevent is easily recognized
even by low-ranking subordinates, and the act is also extremely harmful.
Yet, unlike a general instruction to disobey all illegal orders that are also
grossly immoral, the lawmaker can use a list of specific rules to teach
soldiers certain acts are illegal. This list will thus reduce conditioned
obedience,296 and if the lawmaker takes care to restrict the list of rules to a
reasonable number, even low-ranking soldiers can be expected to know the
list and recognize when an order violates one of the rules.297
We see this in practice, even today, as military manuals often list certain
illegal acts that should be disobeyed in all circumstances,298 and courtsmartials rule that certain acts should always be disobeyed.299 Moreover, in
specific emergency situations, soldiers are sometimes handed a document
listing certain acts as generally forbidden, in an attempt to help low-ranking
subordinates determine how to act when discretionary emergency laws allow
292
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infringement on general prohibitions.300 Such documents attempt to solve
these subordinates’ difficulty in the following manner: Instead of being
demanded to assess the necessity, proportionality, or reasonableness of an act
ordered (i.e., the benchmarks according to different emergency norms for
determining whether the act ordered is legal),301 subordinates are given a list
of acts they must never perform, even if ordered. Furthermore, there are also
rules set for specific categories of subordinates.302
However, currently legal systems do not consistently rely on such lists
due to a concern, raised by some, that doing so will be both underinclusive
and overinclusive.303 Thus, even within the same legal system, conflicting
rulings can be found amongst different courts that support a normative
approach. Some state that certain acts should always be disobeyed, while
others hold that the determination of whether an illegal order is grossly
immoral should always be case specific, and therefore should not always be
disobeyed.304
However, in light of the failure of current approaches, relying on a list of
disobedience-rules should be strongly and consistently encouraged. Whether
the list would be overinclusive would ultimately depend on the number and
types of rules that a legal system chose to adopt. But, agency analysis
demonstrates that instructing a low-ranking subordinate to disobey an order
when it violates such a disobedience-rule will not result in many mistakes
because it would not delegate too much discretion to that individual.
Whether the list would be underinclusive would again depend on the adopted
rules. To address this concern, lawmakers should formulate specific rules,
mainly for orders that violate legal prohibitions that are also core moral
prohibitions. Subordinates of all ranks can be required to know such
300
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underinclusive).
304
Compare e.g., id. (ruling that an order to punish civilians who violated the law without
the punishment being legally authorized by the judiciary is not an order that should always be
disobeyed, even if illegal), with Central District Court-Martial/325/82 Military Prosecutor v.
M. (unpublished) (Isr.); Southern District Court-Martial/248/88 Military Prosecutor v. A.
(unpublished) (Isr.) (ruling that such illegal orders of extrajudicial punishment should always
be disobeyed).
301
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norms,305 and once clear disobedience-rules are formulated, the likelihood
that subordinates of any rank will obey orders that violate such rules as a
conditioned response will be reduced.306 Thus, although it is true that not all
situations can be contemplated beforehand, setting guidelines ex ante is
preferable to leaving low-ranking soldiers in the dark, which can often lead
to acts of conditioned or mistaken obedience, as well as acts of mistaken
disobedience.
E. Protecting Civilians from Harm
The full list of disobedience-rules will not be identical in all legal
systems. Therefore, I will not attempt to formulate a complete list. In the
following Part, I will instead attempt to formulate basic norms intended to
prevent the violation of laws designed to protect civilians from harm.
1. Rules Applicable in All Emergency Actions
Most schools of moral thought agree on the importance of protecting
individuals from physical harm.307 Moreover, as a constitutional matter, the
domestic civilian population is considered the primary principal in all
democratic societies. Therefore, lawmakers are expected to prevent the
power delegated to military agents from being turned against the civilian
population.308 Similarly, the core aim of international humanitarian law is to
protect civilians from the horrors of war.309 Thus, orders that harm civilians
can be viewed as orders that are extremely harmful to the principal (i.e.,
lawmaker) in the context of both domestic and international law, and a legal
policy should be formulated to encourage subordinates to disobey, whenever
possible, orders that are harmful to this aim.
Yet, a rule instructing soldiers to disobey all orders that cause harm to
civilians is not plausible. In emergency situations, allowing the military to
harm civilians is sometimes both necessary and legal.310 Furthermore, in
305
See supra notes 149–54 and accompanying text (discussing affirmative requirement
imposed on military personnel to know moral and legal norms).
306
See supra notes 169–71 and accompanying text (noting that more specific legal rules that
delineate categories of orders that should be disobeyed will reduce conditioned obedience).
307
Re’em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness, 131 PHIL. STUD. 369, 372, 388 n.4 (2006).
308
Feaver, supra note 173, at 153; see also McNollgast, supra note 186, at 1662 (analyzing
administrative law in democratic societies from a principal-agent perspective and viewing the
civilians population as the primary principal).
309
Gabriella Blum, The Laws of War and the “Lesser Evil,” 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 1, 3, 56–58
(2010).
310
See, e.g., Olcy Yeúilkaya, International Human Rights Law and Terrorism, in USE OF
FORCE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 49, 62–63 (M. Uğur Ersen & Çinar Özen ed., 2010)
(discussing that it is often necessary for the law to give state agents a restricted permission to use
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many emergency situations, the legality of such an order will depend on
whether it violates a discretionary legal norm.
However, we can use this general rule as a template for a more practical
solution. For instance, a narrower rule that instructs a soldier to disobey
orders to intentionally harm civilians would be an appropriate rule, as
intentionally harming civilians is never justified and is always illegal and
grossly immoral.311
We can also construct a rule that instructs subordinates to disobey, even
in times of emergency, orders that are given without any consideration of the
harm caused to civilians, or orders given without any attempt to reduce such
harm.312 Adding this disobedience-rule to the previous rule will increase the
protection afforded to civilians and reduce a subordinate’s indecision that
exists when soldiers are faced with a need to ascertain their superior’s
intentions.313 Yet, because this rule is likely to lead to more mistaken acts of
disobedience than the previous one, a superior orders defense for reasonable
mistakes should accompany it, so that subordinates have a limited incentive
to err on the side of obedience.
Additionally, disobedience-rules can be formulated by identifying
specific actions harmful to civilians that are universally agreed never to be
legal. Rape, torture, forced pregnancy, forced medical experiments, and
forced medical treatments that are done for any purpose other than for
improving patient health are prototypical examples of such acts.314

force against civilians in order to enable them to properly respond to emergency situations).
311
An act intentionally harming civilians is viewed as a greater wrong than an act where
civilians are knowingly harmed in an attempt to achieve another aim. This moral intuition is
commonly applied both in criminal law and in international humanitarian law. PHILLIPA
FOOT, VIRTUES AND VICES 22–25 (1978); 1 GEORGE P. FLETCHER, THE GRAMMAR OF
CRIMINAL LAW: AMERICAN, COMPARATIVE, AND INTERNATIONAL 316 (2007).
312
The protection of core public aims is often extended to include a duty to consider the risk
to such aims associated with one’s actions. See George P. Fletcher, The Theory of Criminal
Negligence: A Comparative Analysis, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 401, 402 (1971).
313
See id. at 404–05 (stating, in a different context than the one discussed herein, that by
adopting a presumption that individuals intend the natural and probable consequences of their
acts the law shifts the “question of intent to an inquiry about the natural and probable
consequences of acts” which aids in avoiding the difficulties that arise when one attempts to
ascertain another person’s intent).
314
All these acts are prohibited, in both domestic and international law, in both peacetime
and emergencies. See, e.g., Blum, supra note 309, at 22–23 (examining torture). Sometimes,
elements of these crimes are phrased differently in different contexts. However, when such
differences exist, many support a policy that unifies the definitions through interpretation. For
a discussion of this policy in the context of torture and murder, see KNUT DÖRMANN,
ELEMENTS OF WAR CRIMES UNDER THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
COURT: SOURCES AND COMMENTARY 44–45 (2003).
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2. Use of Force in Emergencies Other Than Armed Conflicts
Other than the rules just stated, I predict lawmakers will encounter
difficulties in defining more disobedience-rules that are applicable in all
emergency situations. Because military emergencies vary greatly in nature,
it will often be more efficient to set specific disobedience-rules governing
different types of emergencies.
In emergency situations, a law instructing low-ranking subordinates to
disobey what they suspect are illegal orders will usually not benefit the
lawmaker, given it delegates an extensive amount of discretion to a less
capable agent. But, that is not always the case. As discussed in the context
of the mission orders doctrine, a low-ranking subordinate is not always less
capable of making proper decisions during emergencies.315 Thus, in
situations where the low-ranking subordinate has more access to the rapidly
changing situation as it develops, an attempt to assess macro-level concerns
during the decisionmaking process would not be beneficial. If the harm from
the commission of wrongful acts in such a situation can also be expected to
be uniquely severe, the lawmaker should then give the lower-ranking
subordinate the discretion to disobey illegal orders. This conclusion applies
mostly to situations where force is used against civilians in non-combat
emergency situations.
Most schools of moral thought, as well as the actual practice of most legal
systems, agree that we can only abide the use of force against civilians when
the decision to use such force is based on an analysis of the concrete,
individual factors at hand,316 barring macro-level considerations.317 This
315

See supra Part V.D (discussing orders given in emergency situations).
See Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the Growing Use of
American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1291,
1302–03, 1308–10 (1993) (comparing when peace officers and the military can use deadly
force against civilians); Mark S. Martins, Rules of Engagement for Land Forces: A Matter of
Training, Not Lawyering, 143 MIL. L. REV. 1, 27 (1994) (comparing soldiers’ authorization to
use force against civilians in times of peace versus times of war); Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It
Necessary to Apply “Physical Pressure” to Terrorists—And to Lie about It?, 23 ISR. L. REV.
192, 197 (1989) (“The necessity defense is by its very nature an emergency measure; it is not
suited to situations which recur over long periods of time. This is especially so when the
claimant to the benefits of the defense is a state agency (or its members).”); FLETCHER, supra
note 70, at 795–96 (explaining why the necessity defense should be limited to times of
“imminent risk”). The explanations given for how emergency norms are formulated differ
between jurists, depending on the moral view they hold. Yet, despite this plurality of
opinions, there is a strong consensus concerning the way legal permissions to use force against
civilians in emergencies should be formulated. This consensus is of course not absolute
because this issue raises complex moral dilemmas. But, this consensus is expressed
extensively in moral theory and even more so in legal practice. As such, it should serve as the
basis for formulating legal norms.
317
ALEXANDER & SHERWIN, supra note 226, at 56, 155–56; FLETCHER, supra note 70, at
795; Tanya R. Ward, Act-Consequentialism and Permitting Too Much, in PHILOSOPHICAL
316
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consensus on the use of a case-specific analysis should serve as the basis for
formulating legal rules.318 When viewed alongside the rationale behind the
mission orders doctrine, it follows that in situations where civilians could be
harmed, discretion should be allotted to the soldier on the field, regardless of
that soldier’s rank.319
However, one should not conclude that commanders should never be
allowed to determine when and how much force can be used. If a
commander in the field gives a lower-ranking soldier the order, it is
appropriate to encourage the lower-ranking soldier to obey. To do otherwise
would unnecessarily increase mistakes.
Thus, a legal rule can be formulated for those situations where orders are
given to use force in a non-combat emergency. With the exception of orders
given face-to-face in the field, all such orders should be disobeyed if they
prevent subordinates from making more concrete assessments regarding
when and how much force should be used.320 Moreover, this rule can easily
be divided into several clearer sub-rules governing non-combat emergency
situations. First, any order given ex ante, or by a commander away from the
field, cannot forbid subordinates from exercising their own discretion in
assessing the necessity of using force.321 Second, any order to use force
against civilians that is not given in response to an immediate situation
should be disobeyed, even if given face-to-face. Accordingly, orders given
by a commander to use force as punishment for a civilian’s past acts or to
deter a civilian from committing future acts should be disobeyed.322
FRONTIERS 151, 154–56 (Richard H. Corrigan & Mary E. Farrell eds., 2008) (arguing the
moral demand to assess long-term effects of an action depends on the extent in which we can
reasonably expect the relevant agent to be able to assess such effects with sufficient accuracy);
Re’em Segev, Well-Being and Fairness in the Distribution of Scarce Health Resources, 30 J.
MED. & PHIL. 231, 241 (2005) (“[I]n resolving specific conflicts, the overall state of wellbeing might seem too detached, since it is comprised of actors that would often have nothing
to do with the conflict at hand . . . .”).
318
See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 158–61, 165, 171 (1993), and FLETCHER, supra
note 311, at 66–67 (discussing the moral significance of formulating legal norms based on an
“overlapping consensus”).
319
For the current implications of this consensus on the rules of engagement for soldiers
engaged in emergencies other than armed conflicts, see, e.g., Schlichter, supra note 316, at
1303–06; Martins, supra note 316, at 27; Thomas R. Lujan, Legal Aspects of Domestic
Employment of the Army, 27 PARAMETERS 82, 88, 93–95 (1997).
320
A similar rule already exists in many legal systems. According to this rule, in all
emergencies other than armed conflicts, the use of force ”must be justified by the necessity of
the situation, and does not become legal by reason of the decision to call in the troops.” A.W.
BRADLEY & K.D. EWING, CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 627 (15th ed. 2011);
see also Charles R. Murray, Civil Disturbance, Justifiable Homicide and Military Law, 54
MIL. L. REV. 129, 153, 157 (1971).
321
Manley v. State, 62 Tex. Crim. 392, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 1911); McLaughin v. Ministry
of Defense, [1978] N.I.J.B. (No. 7) at 11–12 [hereinafter McLaughin].
322
Southern District Court-Martial/248/88 Military Prosecutor v. A. (unpublished) (Isr.);
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These rules can be easily taught and implemented. Furthermore, such
rules create a division of labor similar to the one suggested by the mission
orders doctrine; assessments of macro-level factors should be made by
higher-ranking superiors, while on-the-spot assessments should be left to
those in the field.323
3. Use of Force in Armed Conflicts
A different solution must be formulated for orders that authorize the use
of force against civilians during armed conflicts. The main norm regulating
this issue during armed conflicts is international humanitarian law’s
prohibition against disproportional attacks. Harming civilians is legal,324 but
only if it is incidental to an attack on a military target and not clearly
excessive in relation to the military advantage attained by attacking the
military target.325 Unlike the norms that deal with the use of force against
civilians in other emergencies, international humanitarian law’s
proportionality norm does not demand a concrete, act-specific assessment.326
Notwithstanding differences in the interpretation of the proportionality
requirement,327 there is a general consensus that the military advantage328
Central District Court-Martial/325/82 Military Prosecutor v. M. (unpublished) (Isr.).
323
See supra Part V.D; see also Farrell v. Secretary of State for Defense [1980] 1 Eng. Rep.
166, 172 (appeal taken from Northern Ireland) (requiring soldiers on the field to use
reasonableness in executing military plans); McLaughin, supra note 321, at 7–8
(demonstrating a soldier’s responsibility to make a reasonableness assessment when
conducting security operations); McMahan v. Green, 34 Vt. 69, 73 (1861).
324
The prohibition against disproportional attack applies also to civilian property damage. I
do not, however, think the rules set herein for low-ranking subordinates should be applicable
when property damage is contemplated. First, it is commonly accepted that less protection
can be afforded to property than to human life. E.g., FLETCHER, supra note 70, at 779.
Second, whether a particular property is a legitimate target is determined by the military
advantage to be had in targeting that property. DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 84–86. Thus, the
status of property is often temporal, and much less clear than the status of individuals.
Moreover, this makes the relevant assessment one that low-ranking soldiers are ill-equipped to
make. See Wasserstrom, supra note 137, at 202 (asserting that the determination of issues of
military necessity is too difficult a task to place on lower ranked soldiers).
325
See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 8(2)(iv).
326
For a discussion of this difference as it affects the instructions given to soldiers
concerning the use of force, see Schlichter, supra note 316, at 1302–03, 1308–10; Martins,
supra note 316, at 27. See also Blum, supra note 309, at 40–44 (discussing the difference
between the “lesser of evils” balance that should be made in IHL and in domestic law).
327
Hamutal E. Shamash, How Much Is Too Much? An Examination of the Principle of Jus
in Bello Proportionality, 2 ISR. DEF. FORCES L. REV. 103, 107 (2006).
328
A military advantage is attained when the military object attacked has an effective
contribution to the enemy’s military operation. 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note
4, at 29. According to a commonly held view, the assessment of “the anticipated military
advantage can [also] include increased security for the attacking forces or friendly forces.” 1
id. at 31.
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needs to be assessed in relation to the “attack as a whole.” That is, on the
one hand, the assessment of the expected advantage should not be done in
relation to the whole conflict; on the other hand, it should not be assessed
“bullet by bullet.”329 Instead, it needs to be made in relation to the current
tactical operation as well as to several tactical operations that are connected
to that operation. Usually only division commanders and higher-ranking
soldiers can be expected to properly make such an assessment.330 This
makes it difficult to demand that lower-ranking soldiers make an
independent assessment of proportionality, and such a legal demand would
likely cause many mistakes.331
The problem with demanding low-ranking subordinates to make
independent proportionality assessments has led scholars to support one of
two views. First, some scholars claim the rule prohibiting disproportional
attacks should be interpreted as addressing only commanders of a
sufficiently high rank.332 Others think this prohibition is addressed to all
soldiers. However, they acknowledge the problem that arises if all soldiers
are asked to make such assessments, and therefore argue that low-ranking
soldiers should only be required to “be thoroughly aware, [when] carrying
out [their] task, of [their] basic obligation to spare the civilian population as
much as possible.”333 Yet, both of these views are problematic in the context
of acts committed under orders.
Requiring only high-ranking commanders to make the proportionality
assessment causes two problems. First, this course of action does not take
advantage of a lawmaker’s ability to deter commanders by targeting
subordinates for criminal liability while offering them an opportunity to
escape punishment in exchange for implicating their superiors, through the
use of a superior orders defense. Second, this position ignores that even lowranking soldiers are sometimes afforded discretion in the orders given to

329

DÖRMANN, supra note 314, at 169–73; DINSTEIN, supra note 4, at 123.
See the views of Switzerland, Austria, and the U.K., as cited in 1 HENCKAERTS &
DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 4, at 54. See also William J. Fenrick, The Rule of
Proportionality and Protocol I in Conventional Warfare, 98 MIL. L. REV. 91, 102, 108–09,
112 (1982) (claiming that the in bello proportionality norm is only addressed to soldiers of a
sufficiently high rank-usually division commanders and higher ranking officers-because only
such soldiers are capable of making an assessment of proportionality). Note that, as Fenrick
rightly states, there is some variation between different militaries concerning the lowest rank
that is authorized and capable to make such assessments. Id.; see also sources cited supra
note 287. For a discussion of division commanders and their responsibility for high-level
tactical assessments, see Johnson, supra note 281, at 38.
331
Fenrick, supra note 330, at 109; OSIEL, supra note 10, at 64.
332
E.g., Fenrick, supra note 330, at 109–12; 1 HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note
4, at 54 (noting the views of Switzerland, Austria, and the U.K.).
333
FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 100 (1987).
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them, and if such discretion is given, even low-ranking soldiers should be
obligated to spare civilians as much as possible.
The second view is also flawed. Commanders do not always give lowranking subordinates discretion in how to fulfill their orders. In such
situations, demanding a low-ranking subordinate to disobey whenever she
disagrees with her superior’s proportionality assessment has the strong
potential to severely increase mistakes.
An intermediate solution should thus be adopted. A low-ranking
subordinate should be placed, within the limits of the discretion left to her
after being given an order, under the duty to spare the civilian population as
much as possible. And, when a subordinate clearly has not done so, it is
appropriate to punish her. Furthermore, to reduce the probability that a
subordinate and a commander will disagree on the extent of discretion an
order affords the subordinate, a presumption of discretion should be applied.
This presumption would be that, unless clearly stated otherwise by the
commander, a subordinate should assume the order preserved her discretion
to act in a certain way during the performance of the task ordered, if acting in
such a way is needed to protect civilians.334 This presumption has several
advantages. First, it encourages commanders to give explicit orders, which
reduces the ability of commanders to use vaguely phrased orders as a way to
allege, after the fact, they had no hand in the illegal acts of their
subordinates.335 Subordinates will also be better equipped to recognize
whether an order violates the disobedience-rules discussed earlier (e.g.,
whether the motive behind the order is to intentionally harm civilians).
Secondly, this presumption serves as a substitute for a common professional
perspective.336 If both subordinates and superiors are instructed to interpret
orders with this presumption in mind, it will reduce the likelihood they will
interpret an order differently. While this presumption is imperfect, it is
preferable to the currently used conditional liability approaches. Soldiers
often do not take the time to critically examine the legality or morality of an
order when they are in emergency situations and simply obey.337 This
presumption does not represent a perfect solution to this soldiers’ tendency,
but because it informs subordinates they have a unique responsibility with
regard to the specific issue of protecting civilians from harm, it is less likely
to create a tendency for conditioned obedience to horrific, illegal orders
334

Cf. Appeal/113/61 Rubnov v. Chief Military Prosecutor (unpublished) (Isr.) (adopting an
even more extensive interpretive presumption).
335
See OSIEL, supra note 10, at 129.
336
See supra Part V.D (characterizing mission orders); see also Johnson, supra note 281, at
98 (discussing how common procedures reduce the likelihood for variance in interpretation of
orders).
337
OSIEL, supra note 10, at 119, 241 n.21; sources cited supra note 294; see also supra Part
IV.A.2.
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compared to a more general instruction (such as an instruction to disobey all
illegal orders or an instruction to disobey all grossly immoral illegal orders).
To further prevent low-ranking subordinates from committing crimes of
obedience during armed conflicts, specific disobedience-rules should be set
that prohibit the commission of certain acts during armed conflicts. The
main source for such rules should be the penal prohibitions of international
humanitarian law.338 Moreover, by addressing the disobedience-rules that
should be formulated based in these prohibitions, the legal policy
international law should adopt can be further uncovered.
Until this point, the Article has assumed that domestic legal standards
should track those applied in the realm of international law.339 However, it is
important to stress that domestic legal systems can, and should, be allowed to
treat their own war criminals more harshly than they would be treated under
the international rules suggested herein for armed conflicts. As discussed
earlier, states should not be allowed to be inconsistent in the way they treat
foreign soldiers who commit crimes of obedience.340 Nothing prevents a
state, however, from affording its own soldiers a less extensive defense than
the one suggested herein,341 and doing so would be appropriate if a state
could expect a low-ranking soldiers’ knowledge of international
humanitarian law to be more extensive than assumed in this Article. Thus,
the disobedience-rules that will now be discussed for armed conflicts suggest
only the minimum that should be accepted by all states.342 States can and
should seek to apply a higher standard to their own soldiers where possible.
One step that should be taken in light of the rationales of international
humanitarian law is to extend the disobedience-rules already formulated
herein, as they apply in armed conflicts, to prevent harm to all categories of
protected persons, not just civilians. Doing so is consistent with international
humanitarian law, which extends to such persons the same protections that
are afforded to civilians.343
338
Currently IHL penal prohibitions have been codified in the Rome Statute, supra note 14.
While there has been some dispute as to whether certain norms of this code go beyond the
prohibition of customary international law, this is not the case with regard to the core
prohibition discussed herein.
339
See supra Part V.A.
340
See supra Part V.A.
341
Osiel, supra note 20, at 1083; INT’L INST. HUMANITARIAN L., SAN-REMO MANUAL ON
THE PROTECTION OF VICTIMS OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS ¶ 307 (2004) (“The
following general principles derive from generally accepted international law and apply to
crimes under international law. National laws may provide for a stricter responsibility for the
commission or participation in prohibited conduct, including war crimes.”).
342
See Geiss, supra note 238, at 96–97 (denoting IHL as the lowest common denominator
all sides agree upon).
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CURTIS F.J. DOEBBLER, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 23–24
(2005).
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Yet, other than this general policy, which specific prohibitions of
international humanitarian law should serve as bases for additional
disobedience-rules? Two main rationales should guide us: (1) the clarity of
the relevant prohibition; and (2) the moral significance of the aim protected
by the prohibition. When these rationales exist, we can assume that soldiers
are likely to be able to correctly recognize such orders,344 and the harm that
will be caused if such crimes of obedience are allowed is high.
Thus, clear prohibitions of international humanitarian law that intend to
safeguard civilians or other protected persons should serve as the basis for
disobedience-rules. Accordingly, subordinates of all ranks should be
instructed to disobey orders that: (1) are intended to force protected persons
to serve in hostile armies; (2) are intended to compel foreign nationals to take
part in war operations directed at their own country; (3) demand pillaging; or
(4) demand taking hostages.
What about the prohibitions against genocide and crimes against
humanity? Such acts have the potential to cause extensive, severe, and
morally reprehensible harm to the physical wellbeing of civilians.345 The
harm from mistaken acts of disobedience that might be caused by
disobedience-rules that tell soldiers to disobey such orders will often pale in
comparison to the harm wrought by genocide and crimes against humanity.
Thus, strong support exists for rejecting the applicability of any superior
orders defense in the context of orders to commit genocide or crimes against
humanity.346 The problem, however, with adopting such a policy is that it is
difficult to view each and every participant in such acts as morally
blameworthy, because, sometimes, low-ranking subordinates will not be able
to recognize the act they are ordered to perform is part of a crime against
humanity or genocide. Therefore, to completely reject the applicability of
the superior orders defense in the context of such crimes is inappropriate.347
That is not to say, however, that low-ranking subordinates should have a
duty to obey such orders. The policy suggested thus far offers a solution to
this problem. In the context of low-ranking subordinates, the disobediencerules suggested in this article thus far that intend to safeguard civilians from
harm are able to strongly aid in the prevention of crimes against humanity
and genocide. At the same time they provide clearer guidance to

344

See supra Part IV.A.
Some even view the crime of genocide as intrinsically more immoral than other
international crimes. See Steven R. Ratner, Can We Compare Evils? The Enduring Debate on
Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, 6 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 583, 584–87 (2007).
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Rome Statute, supra note 14, art. 33(2).
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BASSIOUNI, supra note 12, at 612–13; Ilias Bantekas, Defences in International Criminal
Law, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 263, 273 (Dominic McGoldrick
ed., 2004).
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subordinates, and thus take into account the relevant excusatory
considerations.
In international humanitarian law, however, additional penal prohibitions
exist that attempt to advance public aims other than securing protected
persons’ safety; namely preventing unnecessary suffering of combatants and
regulating interaction between belligerents.348 Should these prohibitions
serve as the basis for the formulation of disobedience-rules? Many of these
norms are phrased technically, such as those that list which weapons are
prohibited, and therefore, low-ranking subordinates cannot be expected to
know all of them.349 Moreover, since intentional suffering of soldiers is
allowed and considered a legitimate public aim during an armed conflict, it is
clear that the significance of the aim protected by such norms is weaker.
Thus, low-ranking subordinates should not be expected to disobey illegal
orders that violate such prohibitions and a superior orders defense should be
afforded when they do so.
With that said, it should be acknowledged that it is impossible to create a
completely clear boundary separating prohibitions intended to protect noncombatants from those that regulate hostile parties.350 Thus, to avoid an
underinclusive legal policy, bright-line prohibitions that regulate those issues
found on the border between these two sub-categories of international
humanitarian law should be used as sources for additional disobediencerules. Soldiers should thus be instructed to disobey: (1) orders to physically
harm a combatant who has surrendered, or who has been wounded to the
extent that she cannot continue to participate in the fighting; as well as any
other orders that would deny quarter from a hors de combat (2) orders to
wear civilian clothes either during combat or in close proximity to an area
where combat is expected to occur; (3) orders to wear the uniforms or the
insignia of other protected persons; (4) orders to use signals of surrender
when surrender is not intended; and (6) orders to poison food and water
supplies.
In sum, the discussion made in the current subsection, when viewed in
light of the conclusions reached previously, uncovers the main norms that
should guide international law’s policy regarding crimes of obedience.
Certain illegal orders, mainly those that violate core prohibitions intended to
safeguard civilians and other protected persons, should be disobeyed by all,
even low-ranking, soldiers. But, as to orders that violate other legal norms,
low-ranking soldiers should be allowed to obey those orders and be afforded
a superior orders defense when they do. High-ranking subordinates, on the
348
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other hand, should be obligated to disobey all illegal orders and should only
enjoy a superior orders defense for acts of obedience committed due to
reasonable mistakes. Moreover, if they are members of the “General Staff,”
they should never enjoy a superior orders defense. Such a policy affords
extensive protection against crimes of obedience, while reducing
inconsistency and uncertainty.
VI. CONCLUSION
The issue of obedience to illegal military orders has long been a core
issue in international criminal law, due to the fact that many, if not most, war
crimes are crimes of obedience. This issue is also a cardinal one for
domestic legal systems because obedience to orders is the backbone of any
military. Yet, despite the core importance of this issue in both domestic and
international law, the law on the subject remains unclear and disputed. In
light of the failure of both international and domestic legal systems to fairly
and efficiently address this legal issue, this Article has used agency analysis
to show that none of the currently supported approaches is appropriate when
applied in every scenario. Accordingly, a combination of approaches should
be adopted depending on the individual factors in any given situation. The
law should apply different approaches depending on the rank of the
subordinate and whether the order is given in an emergency situation.
Even though this policy will cause low-ranking subordinates to
knowingly obey some illegal orders during emergencies, this result can be
justified both by the severe harm that might be caused if low-ranking
subordinates were forced to review the legality of all orders in times of
emergency and also by the strong excusatory considerations that exist in such
cases. Additionally, this policy still provides extensive protection against the
harms that might be caused by crimes of obedience by: (1) vesting highranking subordinates with a duty to obey only legal orders, even in times of
emergency; (2) encouraging low-ranking soldiers who obey illegal orders to
implicate their superiors by affording them a superior orders defense; and (3)
setting core disobedience-rules that are applicable even to low-ranking
subordinates in emergencies.
The formulation of this model legal policy can thus serve as a resource
for lawmakers who wish to reform the law of obedience to illegal orders.
Moreover, this model legal policy shows that regulating the issue in a
modular way can release lawmakers and soldiers from the harm inflicted by
the archaic premise that the same approach should regulate the issue of
obedience to orders at all times. Thus, in light of the debt owed to those who
are ready to sacrifice their liberty and lives for their countries, as well as the
need to maintain both military efficiency and crime prevention, the current
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unattainable quest for a proper one-rule-fits-all policy must be abandoned in
favor of a modular approach.

